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Abstract:
Modern mechanisms of state surveillance reinforce gendered, raced, classed and sexed
power hierarchies. Forms of control and regulation of “problem bodies” are framed as neutral
or benign forms of bureaucratic bookkeeping (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). This thesis
explores the possible Islamophobic and Anti-Black dimensions of Counter Violent Extremism
(CVE) program, a counterterrorism community outreach program initiated by the federal
government in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, which targets the Somali community. I will be
evaluating whether CVE programs, initiated by state agencies, transform into a site of
surveillance. This thesis will examine declassified state documents from sources such as
Homeland Security and the FBI relating to CVE programs, which detail program rationale,
function, and implantation. My research will examine the presence of Anti-Black racism and
Islamophobia in the purpose and deployment CVE programs. Additionally, I will be analyzing
how mechanisms of surveillance operate at the intersections of Anti-Black racism and
Islamophobia and how do CVE programs impact and shape the lived realities of Somali
Muslims. This study of CVE programs is, by necessity, an analysis of power relations, and
relies on an intersectional feminist approach to surveillance studies. Through this, I will
produce a coherent understanding of how surveillance mechanisms build on the criminalization
and over-policing of Black communities to surveil, mark and easily monitor Somali Muslims in
Minnesota. The recent election of Donald Trump and the looming threat to activate a Muslim
registry makes this research more relevant and necessary.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On October 3rd, 2012, Muslim Advocate—a national legal advocacy organization that
focuses on protecting civil rights and liberties of Muslims—filed a first amendment complaint
on behalf of eleven Muslim organizations and individual plaintiffs (Center for Constitutional
Rights, 2015). The lawsuit “challenges the New York Police Department’s suspect-less
surveillance of Muslim Americans in New Jersey solely because of their Muslim identity”
(Center for Constitutional Rights, 2012). The systemic surveillance of Muslim communities
and individuals by the New York Police Department began shortly after the attacks on the
World Trade Center. The NYPD “established a sprawling and secretive human mapping and
suspicion-less surveillance program that targeted Muslim American communities in New York,
New Jersey, and beyond” (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2012). New York City Mayor Bill
de Blasio’s attempt to settle the lawsuit was rejected by a federal judge because the proposed
deal did not provide sufficient oversight of an agency that habitually, and purposefully violated
free speech and religion laws (Apazu and Goldman, 2016). On the election trail, thenpresidential candidate Donald Trump urged Mayor de Blasio to reinstate NYPD’s surveillance
of Muslims, arguing that surveillance of Muslims is beneficial and needed (ACLU, 2016).
Trump’s statement reflects the impasse in the United States where fear and suspicion around
Muslims has reached a tipping point. During the first few weeks of his presidency, Donald
Trump issued an executive order that barred refugees and immigrants from seven Muslimmajority countries from entering the United States (ACLU, 2016). In the same month, Reuters
News Agency reported that Trump would revamp Counter Violent Extremism, a program
focused on preventing violent domestic extremism, to concentrate solely on Muslims (Edwards,
Volz and Cooke, 2016). Trump included Somalia in his Muslim ban. One of the justifications
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given by the Trump administration for banning Somali immigrants is the threat to national
security that Somalis pose (Siddiqui, 2017).
The success of Al-Shabaab— a Somali terrorist group, founded in 2007— in recruiting
members of the Somali diaspora, both in Europe and North America, caused an intense scrutiny
and monitoring of the Somali diaspora in Europe and the United States. The suspicion and fear
amplified when a group of Somali-American men from Minneapolis, MN left the United States
to join Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia in 2009. At least five Somali-Americans were killed
while fighting for Al-Shabaab, while the United States government indicted another 14 for
providing logistical and financial support to the Minneapolis Al-Shabaab network (Vidino,
Pantucci, and Kohlmann, 2010). The intensified scrutiny around radicalized Somali men from
Minnesota served as justification for police and profile Somalis, especially young Somali men,
as potential terrorists (Abdi, 2015). The anxieties around the Somali community materialized in
a distinctly anti-Somali expression of Islamophobia— or racism directed at Muslims or those
who present as such— fueled by Somalia’s geopolitical instability (Abdi, 2015). Such paranoia
and fear place Somali communities at the center of the global war on terror. As such, this
research contextualizes the surveillance of Somali immigrants within the increased suspicion of
Somali Muslims as potential terrorists to examine the possible Anti-Black and Islamophobic
dimensions of state surveillance vis-à-vis Counter Violent Extremism programs. The study
examines whether Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia underpin the purpose and deployment
of CVE programs. Therefore, this thesis utilizes an intersectional feminist approach to
surveillance studies to produce a coherent understanding of how surveillance, Anti-Blackness,
and Islamophobia intersect in the experiences of Somali Muslims.
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Throughout the United States, Muslims are targeted through suspect-less surveillance
and intelligence gathering (ACLU, 2016). The heightened paranoia around Somali Muslims
legitimizes invasive, unconstitutional and discriminatory programs like the NYPD’s
surveillance program, which exploits the Islamophobic political climate. Counter Violent
Extremism (CVE) programs and Building Community Resilience, the rebranded Minnesotan
articulation of CVE program, are part of a larger initiative developed by the Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (Strategic
Implementation Plan, 2015). CVE programs are counterterrorism preventive measures that
focus on community engagement and outreach to foster collective response to violent
extremism. CVE programs’ community outreach element directs communities to identify
radicalized individuals, then stage “interventions” to prevent them from engaging in violent
extremism (Building Community Resilience, 2015). However, law enforcement agencies
remain central to the “communal” targeted-intervention model of CVE programs. Additionally,
CVE programs do not provide any oversight or safeguarding measures to ensure that
community outreach programs cannot be used for the surveillance of Muslims (Prince, 2015).
Consequently, the possible discriminatory use of CVE programs in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
raised concerns among Somali Muslims and civil right groups about the stigmatizing and
marginalized impact CVE initiatives can have on the Somali community. With the potential for
institutionalizing Islamophobia and racism, repressive effects CVE programs need to examined.
Much like the 1980s and 1990s moral panic around drugs, early articulations of the war on
terror focused on direct action tactics such as waging wars, occupation, drone warfare,
entrapment, extralegal confinement, detention, and torture. However, counterterrorism recently
began shifting from direct action to soft-counterterrorism measures that attempt to address the
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underlying causes of radicalization and domestic terrorism (Aziz 2014). Early national
strategies to combat violent extremism focused on the possible ways communities can provide
solutions through localized CVE initiatives that federal officials believed will foster better
relationship between local police agencies and communities (The White House Summit on
Countering Violent Extremism, 2015).
While language in official documents detailing CVE strategy is careful, and politically
neutral, CVE programs are facilitated and deployed within a political climate that is hostile,
suspicious, and hyper-focused on Muslims’ supposed criminality. Although CVE programs do
not necessarily single out Muslims, community engagement dimension of CVE programs
exclusively focuses on Muslim communities in the three pilot cities: Boston, Los Angeles, and
Minneapolis. The White House’s official CVE strategic plan did not include other types of
domestic terrorism such as eco-terrorism, right-wing white terrorists, and anti-abortion
violence. CVE propaganda materials— which ranges from online videos to funding community
programming— often targets Muslims. For example, a Department of Homeland Security
report stipulates the creation of a CVE grant program “to support comprehensive, communitybased initiatives, in coordination with U.S. Attorney offices” (CVE Program Assessment, 2016,
pg. 6). The report lists possible grants recipients and almost all listed organizations and
programming initiatives target Muslims (CVE Program Assessment, 2016). During the
aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, then Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
CVE programs will be revamped to focus on the threats posed by Islamic terrorist
organizations. The directive tasked local authorities in the three pilot cities to “develop[e] local
CVE frameworks aimed chiefly at ISIS-related radicalization” (Vidino and Hughes, 2015, pg.
7).
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The revamping of CVE strategy in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing
demonstrates that CVE initiatives operate within the larger impetus of counterterrorism and war
on terror. From random TSA searches to the FBI’s abuse of “voluntary” interviews, where
regular conversations with FBI agents often turn into interrogation sessions, to the use of
informants to infiltrate Muslim spaces, counter-terrorism initiatives have always been
selectively enforced against Muslims (Aziz 2014). The color-blind approach to CVE efforts
and the lofty language of strategic partnership with communities are utilized to mask the
behavioral risk assessment and surveillance dimensions of CVE programs. The use of social
services and community engagement is intended to reinstate the trust of the Muslim
community, even at minimal levels, in law enforcement agencies, and normalizes the softsurveillance and soft-counterterrorism elements of CVE programs. Therefore, CVE’s targeted
intervention approach must be situated within the larger context of suspect-less surveillance of
Muslims in America. Subsequently, this chapter will examine the Twin Cities pilot CVE
program to excavate the Islamophobia and Anti-Black rationale that underpins the function,
deployment, and intent of CVE programs. The study explores how the Minnesota CVE pilot
program becomes a surveillance apparatus, which builds on the existing infrastructure of public
safety initiatives and intelligence-gathering tactics that local Minnesotan law enforcement
agencies utilized to police and criminalize working class, Somali immigrants.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
While concerns over the unwarranted surveillance of the Somali community in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota area are intensifying with the recent election of Donald
Trump, government surveillance has always been a challenge and reality that Somali
immigrants faced daily. A central task of this literature review is to assemble and contextualize
relevant scholarship on the Somali diaspora in the United States to understand the impact that
race, class, religion, and immigration status has in shaping the Somali experience with state
surveillance. The literature review will be informed by theoretical perspectives such as feminist
theory, postcolonial theory, critical race theory and feminist approaches to surveillance studies,
while attempting to historicize the Somali immigrant experience in the United States. Also, the
literature review will analyze and examine relevant scholarship on Islamophobia, state
surveillance, and race to explore what it means to be at the intersections of Blackness and Islam
with regards to Somali immigrants. Due to the lack of substantial and relevant scholarship on
the Somali immigrant experience and the Black Muslim experience in relation to Islamophobia,
the literature review will supplement the gaps in scholarship by examining the ways in which
Somalis are racialized as Black and as Muslims. Also, the literature review will contextualize
the Somali experiences within the greater history of the Black American experience with
Islamophobia and state surveillance.
The significance of this research has increased with the recent election of Donald
Trump as president, which ushered an unprecedented rise in Islamophobic rhetoric and hate
crimes against Muslims (Lichtblau, 2016). This project will contribute to the emerging field of
surveillance studies, as well as bridge gaps that exist within the academic scholarship on
Islamophobia and the Black Muslim experience. Numerous research efforts on the intersections
6

of Islamophobia and state surveillance have been undertaken, however, further research is need
to examine how Blackness impacts experiences of surveillance and Islamophobia. Not only
does my research attempts to bridge the gap that exists, but it also serves as a space to articulate
a different narrative that counters the invisibility of Black Muslims in scholarship on
Islamophobia and state surveillance. The literature review will survey scholarship on the
history of Somali immigration to Minnesota as well as ethnographic and sociological studies on
the lived experiences and material realities of Somali immigrants. This will allow me to map
the socio-economic positionality of Somali immigrants and explore how they are impacted by
Anti-Black racism and forms of institutionalized Islamophobia. Additionally, the literature
review will assess scholarship on Islamophobia, especially discussions on the racialization of
Muslims to interrogate how Blackness factors into the racialization of Black Muslims. Lastly,
this literature review will provide a summary of scholarship on surveillance utilizing a feminist
approach to surveillance studies to foreground the theoretical approach applied in this research.
Historicizing Somali Immigrant Experience in Minnesota
In July of 1960, two Somali territories— Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland—
united to form the independent Republic of Somalia. The burgeoning post-colonial state would
experience upheaval when the Somali army staged a military coup, killing the second Somali
president, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969. Major General Siad Barre assumed power,
establishing a military junta in Somalia for two decades. In 1989, the northern Somali
opposition to Siad Barre’s regime intensified and culminated in a resurgence of armed
resistance. For the next few years, Somalia would become increasingly divided and fractured
across tribal lines, due to the use of tribalism by Barre to prolong the life of his autocracy. By
January of 1991, the constant battling on multiple fronts debilitated the Somali army and
7

Barre’s dictatorship dissipated in the quicksand of armed conflict. The fall of Barre’s regime
led to a political fiasco that inflicted more wounds on the country’s fragile stability and ushered
a new era of violence and conflict. Somalis fled the violence to neighboring nations or
relocated to Europe and North America via refugee resettlement programs managed by the
International Organization for Migration (Yusuf, 2013). The Somali civil war is the primary
cause of the increased Somali migration to North America. Minnesota has become a vibrant
hub during the third wave of Somali immigration to the United Stated (Alasow, 2004).
Estimates indicate that between 20,000 and 70,000 Somali immigrants live in Minnesota,
making the state the home for the largest Somali diaspora in the United States (Abdi, 2003). An
accurate and updated population count of Somalis in the United States is unavailable. However,
according to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, more than 100,000 Somali refugees have
been resettled in the United States since 9/11, and almost 16,000 Somalis have resettled in
Minnesota (Goodenough, 2016). Economic factors also contributed to the increased Somali
presence in Minnesota. According to Abdulkadir Alasow (2004), the high demand for unskilled
labor and availability of networks of social support and welfare made Minnesota an ideal place
for Somali refugees to start a new chapter in their lives.
The Somali experience in the Midwest has been significantly impacted by the
meatpacking industry and other forms of unskilled labor such as assembly line factory work
(Alasow, 2004). The meatpacking industry has been vital to the vibrancy and strength of the
Midwest’s economy and ranked as one of the most important industries in terms of output, the
number of workers, and manufacturing value (Warren, 2007; Arts, 2012). The meatpacking
industry shaped the culture and population shift in the Midwest by attracting Latinos and
African immigrants to relocate to the rural part of the Midwest (Alasow, 2004; Warren, 2007).
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Many of meatpacking plants relocated to rural parts to the Midwest and Southern parts of the
United Stated, making the industry reliant on immigrant labor. Somali immigration patterns
were and still are heavily influenced by the demand for unskilled labor (Alasow, 2004;
Haverluk and Trauman, 2008). Additionally, worker wages dictate the quality of life in
communities where meatpacking factories dominate the job market (Warren, 2007).
Somalis began to relocate to the rural parts of Southern Minnesota and began to form
isolated clusters of communities in mostly white towns and cities. The racial, religious,
linguistic and cultural difference between white Americans and immigrants created racial
tensions. For example, the surge of Somali immigrants in Minnesota pushed locals in the rural
town of Owatonna, located in Southern Minnesota, to form a lobbying body that pressured
Congress to decrease the numbers of documented immigrants admitted to the United States to
the pre-1970 levels. The lobbying group also demanded stronger border-control policies to be
implemented by Congress (Alasow, 2004). This exemplifies some of the disapproving
responses to immigrants in Minnesota. Additionally, a Somali-owned business in St. Cloud,
Minnesota, was vandalized in 2016 (Mahamud, 2016). A news article in City Pages decreed the
city of St. Cloud, MN as one of the most hostile city to Somalis. The article recounts various
examples of racism and xenophobia Somali immigrants experience. For example, plans to build
a Mosque in St. Cloud incited a wave of racism and Islamophobia in the city where churches
and veteran groups began hosting anti-immigration speakers and programming (Du, 2016).
These cultural, racial and religious tensions exacerbate the type of alienation
experienced by Somali immigrants, who struggle to be integrated into the wider American
labor force (Abdi, 2015). In her seminal book, Elusive Jannah: The Somali Diaspora and a
Borderless Muslim Identity, Dr. Cawo Abdi (2015) presents a sociological analysis of the
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Somali immigrant experience that is shaped by structural discrimination, systemic income
inequality, and socio-cultural barriers. Abdi’s research (2012) shows that Somali immigrant
communities have been marred by poverty, the fracturing of the Somali familial structure
through refugee relocation policies, spiritual alienation, and a sense of dislocation that is
exacerbated by intense scrutiny from the federal government. International and federal refugee
resettlement programs often prioritized women and children, which forces incoming Somali
immigrants to redefine traditional roles of motherhood and femininity (Abdi, 2015).
International and American refugee resettlement programs often prioritize vulnerable groups
such as children, women and female-headed households for assistance and support. As seen in
the Syrian refugee crisis, refugee families opt to register as female-headed household, forcing
male family members who are of age to register separately, thereby altering the structure of the
refugee family (Turner, 2016). Not only does this place Somali families in difficult economic
situations, but also creates an unusual gender arrangement that forces Somali families to be
under the watchful eye of the American welfare regimes and law enforcement agencies (Abdi,
2014b/2015c). While the shift in normative gender structures of Somali refugee families might
be subverting patriarchal dynamics of power relations, it also impacts the socioeconomic
conditions of Somali refugees (Abdi, 2014).
Somali Immigrants: Conditions and Material Reality
In her essay “The Newest African-Americans? Somali Struggles for Belonging,” Dr.
Cawo Abdi (2012) argues that the lack of formal education and English language skills
hindered Somali refugees’ access to viable employment opportunities. Due to their refugee
status, Somali immigrants automatically qualify for various types of federal and local
assistance, which ranged from subsidized housing to cash assistance. While Somalis in social
10

welfare programs report a higher average income than other welfare recipients, obligations to
support families left in conflict zones compromises the economic stability of the Somali
households. The few limited economic opportunities afforded to Somali refugees, especially for
female-headed households, necessitates a reliance on state and federal welfare support.
Government assistance often supplements the income Somali refugee families earn from their
low-wage, unskilled labor employment and provide some economic relief (Abdi, 2012a).
Stretching an income that is already low has significant consequences for the refugee
household in America. This cycle of work, public assistance, and financial remittances to
families elsewhere diminishes the ability of individuals and families to save and execute longterm financial planning for Somali families. Many resorts to survival techniques that involve
planning from month to month, placing them in a precarious socioeconomic position (Abdi,
2012). Somali refugees occupy a marginal economic position in the American society. Somali
immigrants experience extreme poverty with 51 percent of Somalis living in poverty—four
times the rate for African Americans. In contrast, 41 percent of Arab and South Asian Muslim
families in America have an average income mean of $50,000 (Abdi, 2012). The dependency
of Somali immigrants on government assistance for survival makes the Somali immigrant
community highly visible to state surveillance as the state retains uninterrupted access to
Somali immigrants. Historically, poor Black women have been racially profiled and surveilled
through welfare regimes that focus on possible criminal and fraudulent behavior of Black
mothers. Law enforcement agencies often intimidate, police and surveil Black families on
welfare assistance and assume unrestricted access, especially to Section 8 voucher holders and
public housing residents, by engaging in warrantless searches of Black homes and investigating
the intimate lives of Black women (Ocen, 2012). Welfare has been a site of surveillance of
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Black motherhood. For example, welfare recipients’ sensitive and private information such as
income, immigration status, and criminal records are collected by welfare agencies and shared
with various government agencies (Maki, 2011). This demonstrates that the racial and
economic realities of Somalis exacerbate their vulnerability to state surveillance in the same
way Black women are rendered susceptible to racial harassment and invasive monitoring vis-àvis the welfare state.
As welfare programs become more reliant on surveillance and other punitive measures,
connections between poverty and criminality deepen in the public imagination. The
vulnerability of Somali immigrants to state surveillance cannot be accurately assessed without
contextualizing the socially manufactured docility of Somalis in their racial, gendered, and
economic background. Material conditions of Somali refugees in the United States are rooted in
the legacy of Black oppression. In “Somali Social Justice Struggle in the US: A Historical
Context,” Jesse Mills (2008) contextualizes the Somali diasporic experience within the greater
history of Black Americans. Mills argues that the Blackness of Somali immigrants coupled
with their immigration status produces a distinct racialization experience that is rooted within
the Black experience in America. The Somali immigrant experience is heavily impacted by the
tangible reality of being racialized as Black. Somalis are more likely to live in poverty, be
unemployed, lack access to adequate healthcare, and have higher rates of incarceration due to
their Blackness (Abdi, 2012; Mills, 2012). An American Community Survey found Somalis
have the highest poverty rate of all new immigrants, with 51 percent of Somalis live in poverty
(Abdi, 2012). Burdened by their socioeconomic positionality, Somali immigrants rely on
communal bonds to lessen the economic burdens they face, forcing Somalis to become
involuntarily segregated by opting to form community clusters in low-income rental properties
12

and public housing facilities (Abdi, 2012). The social location of Somali immigrants in the
American stratification systems is similar to that of African American communities, yet it is
complicated by their immigration status and Muslim identity (Mills, 2012; Abdi, 2012a/ 2014b/
2015c). The low socioeconomic status of Somalis is often used to advance a narrative that
assumes Somali youth are naturally susceptible to radicalization and criminality (Sperber,
2015). Therefore, any analysis on the realities and material conditions of Somalis must be
situated and contextualized within the condemnation of Blackness in the United States. For
example, Somali immigrants are regulated via “dependence-making, and ethnocentric (often
racist) life instruction by professionals, and the emergent chilling raids, detentions, and
deportations that are billed as gang intervention and anti-terrorism” (Mills, 2012, p. 56). Such
processes reflect eerily similarities to the ways the neoliberal, carceral state controls and
regulates Black bodies (Wacquant, 2010). In Punishing the Poor, Loïc Wacquant (2010)
demonstrates how welfare and penal systems, within the neoliberal state, converge in a
systemic effort to punish and regulate poor, working class inner-cities communities. Wacquant
engages with Bourdieu's concept of bureaucratic fields, or the splintering of state institutions
that act in contradictory and competing ways. As welfare support and assistance for poor,
working class communities declined, prisons expanded (Wacquant, 2010). Wacquant’s analysis
of the carceral-assistential mesh illustrates how neoliberal governance resituates the
disciplinary and regulatory measures within welfare and penal systems. This shift to penalizing
the poor is exemplified by the ways refugee resettlement agencies and other refugee-centric
programs targeting Somali immigrants reinforce punitive war on terror polices and often invites
further scrutiny from law enforcement agencies (Mills, 2012). Additionally, fears around
welfare fraud leads to further scrutiny and surveillance of Somali immigrants (Howson and
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Damp, 2016). For example, suspicions that Somali immigrants attempt to defraud welfare
services led to investigations that encouraged police officers to attend eligibility meetings for
Somalis seeking public benefits (Howson and Damp, 2016). This demonstrates that the
criminalization of Somali immigrates cannot be separated from the criminalization of the
poverty and how the demonization of the poor is vital to carrying out the punitive measures of
the neoliberal carceral state. The connections made between poverty and Somali criminality
often provides justification for the state to surveil and carefully monitor Somali immigrants
while allowing the state to masquerade its surveillance mechanism as after school programs
and recreational sporting activities. In her article for The Guardian, Amanda Sperber (2015)
reports that Somali nonprofit organizations in Minneapolis, MN such as Ka Joog receive grants
from Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programs to provide recreational and after-school
programs for Somali youth. However, many Somalis fear that CVE-funded programs have a
covert surveillance component (Sperber, 2015). An essential part of assessing the vulnerability
of Somali immigrants to state surveillance is determining the ways the material conditions of
Somalis exposes them to the watchful eye of the state.
Racializing Islamophobia: All Muslims as Arab
Historically, religious identities were used to organize and categorize people within
social hierarchies. For example, Europeans, who were Christian, deemed non-Christians as
inferior. Medieval European notions of difference positioned Muslims as inferior and other.
Additionally, Europeans inscribed religious difference on the body by insisting that true
Christians were pure blooded to mark themselves as different from non-Christians and
Christian converts (Selod and Embrick, 2013). Historicizing the racialization of Muslims
reveals the historical and social process of marking Muslims as other. Scholars often center
14

their analysis of the racialization of Muslims on the intersections between Orientalism and
Islamophobia (Arjana, 2015; Said, 1997). Such an approach, while useful, does not account for
the ways Somalis are racialized and culturally othered as Black Muslims. The presence of
Islam in America is often mischaracterized as alien and immigrant. Blackness and Islam are
assumed to be mutually exclusive, entailing that the lived realities and conditions that
characterize the Black experience are not interrogated when discussing Islam in the United
States. In the west, Islam is consumed and understood through the prism of orientalism. In
Covering Islam, Edward Said (1997) contends that “the misrepresentation and distortions
committed in the portrayal of Islam argue neither a genuine desire to understand nor a
willingness to listen and see what there is to listen to” (p. 5). As Moustafa Bayoumi (2016)
contends in his seminal work This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror,
that Islam has become a marker of racial difference, in which Arabs were deemed as foreigners.
Religion determined the racial identity of Arab immigrants in early twentieth century as nonwhite, thereby designating Arab immigrants as unassimilable. The racialization of Islam is
intimately linked to religious prejudices against Arabs and political anxieties around Islamic
terrorism. Bayoumi (2016) argues that orientalism is deeply embedded in American cultural
narratives and politics, both domestic and foreign. Racializing Islam exclusively through the
lenses of orientalism imposed new racial meanings on the Muslim body, which often lies at
intersections of diverging identities. Within the American public imagination, any visible
signifiers of Islam will automatically render Muslims as foreigners and erases the diverse
assemblies of identities within the Muslim community. Bayoumi’s analysis demonstrates how
the cultural othering of Muslims through the prism of orientalism makes Islam incompatible

15

with other vectors of identities. Thus, erecting contradictions that positions Blackness, for
example, as irreconcilable with Muslim-ness.
In “The Story of Islamophobia,” Junaid Rana (2007) traces the anxieties around
Muslims to the Iberian Inquisition, which conflated religious affiliation of Muslims with racial
and ethnic identities. In other words, the Spaniards’ hostility towards the Moorish Islamic
Empire in Southern Spain racialized Muslims and lumped the existing diverse ethnic identities
within the Islamic Empire in Andalusia as one. The racial construction of Muslims, in
Andalusia, utilized religious and ethnic markers to delineate Muslims as “other.” In “Imagining
the Moor in Medieval Portugal,” Josiah Blackmore (2006) states that: “Moor is alternately
denotative and connotative, precise and imprecise, historically accurate and imaginatively
construct [which] gave birth to mouro as a generic label” (pg.29). Although the racial politics
produced by the Iberian Inquisition cannot be understood to be the same as modern
conceptualizations of race, it provides a historical example of a racialized Muslim construct in
medieval Europe. Additionally, the indiscriminate use of “mouro” to describe all Muslims in
Andalusia mirrors what Bayoumi (2016) described as “racing religion,” or articulating cultural
and racial othering through demonizing and demeaning Islam. In a post 9/11 American context,
the racialized imagery of Muslims replaced culture with race, or the assumed biological and
phenotypical differences amongst Muslims, as the vehicle to imagine and inscribe the
inferiority of Muslims. As such, Islamophobia, as a from or racism, is a complex process of
cultural othering wherein Islam or Muslim-ness is intimately tied with “brown” cultural
politics, or orientalist stereotypes of people in the Middle East and South Asia. As Mehdi
Semati (2010) argues in “Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire,” the category
of “brown”— at the intersections of Islamophobia and “brown” cultural politics— transforms it
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from an exotic other to signify terrorism and violence. Specific identities such as Arab, South
Asian and even North African are replaced with a generic category of “brownness” (Semati,
2010). Tracing the emergence of Muslims as others enables us to understand Islamophobia as a
continuous discursive process that situates existing racial hierarchies within the cultural
othering of Muslims.
Moreover, the racialization of Muslims in the United States is heavily influenced by
assimilation politics and the proximity of Arabs to Euro-American racial identities. Post 9/11
discussions about the rise in discriminatory practices towards Muslims became interlinked with
the Arab American experience in the United States (Alsultany, 2012). The historical racial
classification of Arabs as white motivated scholars to situate analysis on Arab identities within
race scholarship to account for their experiences of Islamophobia (Bayoumi, 2016; Selod and
Emrick, 2013). Arabs become increasingly rejected from whiteness as social and political
anxieties around Muslims intensified (Selod and Emrick, 2013). However, Saher Selod and
David Emrick (2013) argue that such scholarship often assume that Arab American identities
are monolithic and overlook the complex arrangement of identities within “Arab-ness.”
“This application of racialization to Arab bodies should be questioned because it does
not accurately reflect or represent all Arab experiences. It is important to clarify the
specific factors, which result in an Arab population being stripped of privileges
associated with whiteness and whether or not this universally impacts the entire Arab
population.” (Selod and Emrick, 2013, pg. 7).
In other words, while some Arabs enjoy a close association with whiteness such as
Syrians (Bayoumi, 2016), many Arab Americans occupy diverging intersectional identities,
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which complicates their relation/proximity to whiteness. Religion is an important vector of
identity that Arab Americans utilize to negotiate and situate themselves in relation to whiteness.
For example, 73 percent of Arab Christians identify as white, while only 50 percent of Arab
Muslims identify as white (Selod and Emrick, 2013). Additionally, Lebanese Shia Muslims
indirectly embrace whiteness by emphasizing their “Americanness” to combat the historical
stigmatization of Shias in Lebanon (Kusow, 2007). These examples demonstrate, not only the
complexities of Arab American identity formation, but the impact of religion in the
racialization of Arabs in the United States.
Frequently, scholarly analysis of the racialization of the Arab Muslims produces an
approximation that links or associates the Arab and/or brown Muslim experience to the Black
American experience (Elver, 2012). For example, law professor Khaled Beydoun (2016) states
that “CVE policing suspicion of Somali-Americans is linked more closely to [sic] these
‘immigrant’ proxies to Muslim identity than it is Blackness, while anti-terror suspicion of
indigenous Black Muslims is closely tied to conversion or political subversion” (pg. 290). In
other words, Beydoun argues that the cultural othering of Somalis as Muslim forms the basis of
surveilling and policing Somali Muslims vis-à-vis CVE programs. Beydoun reinforces the
notion that Somalis are culturally distinct from Black Americans. Such notions often
essentialize cultural and religious traditions of Somalis in a way that denotes a deviation in
Somalis’ phenotypical expression of Blackness. In other words, the Blackness of Somalis is
mitigated, and erased, through a homogenous understanding of Muslim-ness. Even though
Beydoun acknowledges the distinct material reality Blackness imposes on Somali immigrants,
Beydoun conceptualizes Somali immigrants’ experiences of Islamophobia through subjective
cultural elements that does not account for the ways Anti-Black racism transforms and
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complicates the experience, condition, and material realities of Islamophobia in the Somali
immigrant experience. Being poor, working class immigrants exacerbate the vulnerability of
Somalis to over-policing and state surveillance. Thereby, one of the central tasks I undertake in
this research is to demonstrate how the socioeconomic realities of Somali immigrants intersect
with structural forms of Anti-Black racism that enables the state to surveil Somali communities.
The consolidation of the religious identity of Muslims and ethnic identities, as discussed
by Rana (2007), entails that Muslim bodies are racialized in orientalist terms that heavily rely
on “brown” cultural politics. In her analysis of the Black Muslim experiences, law professor
Hilal Elver posits immigrant Brown Muslims in opposition to Black Muslims by extenuating
cultural difference to explain divergence in experiences of Islamophobia between the two
communities. This stands in contrast to the earlier findings of Abdi (2014) and Mills (2012)
wherein the racialization of Somali Muslims, who are immigrants as well, is heavily impacted
by anti-Blackness. For example, Abdi (2015) showcases how Somali immigrants in the United
Arab Emirates experience Islamophobia through being perceived as Arab, while Somali
immigrants in the United States recognize the role their apparent Blackness plays in shaping
and producing a diverging experience of Islamophobia. In an empirical study of Islamophobia,
Steve Garner and Saher Selod (2014) argue that despite the diversity within Muslim
communities, Muslims are homogenized and presented as monolithic. Their research attempts
to complicate Muslim experiences of Islamophobia, especially in their discussion of the
experiences of white Muslim converts, however, the scope of the project does not leave room
to include an empirical analysis of the impact of Anti-Blackness in experiencing Islamophobia.
Somali Muslims occupy intersections of diverging transnational, cultural, and racial identities,
placing Somali diaspora in an isolating cultural space that strips Somalis of any sense of
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belonging (Biglow, 2010). While academic scholarship indicates that Somali Muslims are
racialized along ethnic and racial lines, analysis on the racialization of Somalis along religious
lines remains underdeveloped. It is important to move beyond assumptions that Somali
Muslims only experience Islamophobia as Muslim immigrants and examine the intersections of
Black and Muslim identities, especially with regards to state surveillance.
Characterizing Islamophobia
Questioning the place of Muslims within the United States in the wake of 9/11 began as
Islamophobia, or racism directed at Muslims or those who present as such, became more
visible. John Esposito and Nathan Chapman Lean (2012) argue that Orientalist imagery of
Islam serves as the basis for manufacturing fear and anxiety around Muslims. Esposito and
Lean argue that despite the lack of statistical and material basis for Islamophobia, the fear of
Muslims persists because of a “tight-knit and interconnected confederation of right-wing fear
merchants.” (Esposito and Lean, 2012, pg. 10). The consensus of their book, The Islamophobia
Industry, is that Islamophobia is nurtured and sustained by powerful political institutions and
became a hallmark of American political rhetoric (Esposito and Lean, 2012).
While Esposito and Lean’s project is not contingent upon developing a stable definition
of Islamophobia, it must be noted that the research question and methodical approach dictate
the emerging definition of Islamophobia in academic scholarship. For example, due to the
scope of their research. Esposito and Lean (2012) define Islamophobia as fear of Muslims,
while Kambiz GhaneaBassiri (2013) considers Islamophobia a form of prejudice and symptom
of violent media representations of Islam and Muslims. The attacks of 9/11 made Muslims
become ultra-visible, continuously scrutinized, and marked as the number one enemy of the
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United States (Rana, 2007). As Andrew Shryock (2010) argues in the introduction of
Islamophobia/Islamophilia, “a careful assessment of contemporary geopolitics and deep
historical relations between Muslim and non-Muslim societies” is a prerequisite to producing a
nuanced and sophisticated understanding of Islamophobia (pg. 3). Consequently, limiting
Islamophobia geographically to Europe and North American erases the transnational,
globalized nature of Islamophobia. For example, theorizing of Islamophobia as the irrational
fear of Muslims obscures the ways Muslim communities and countries are designated as a
threat that must be neutralized (Shryock, 2010).
Additionally, limiting Islamophobia geographically obscures how Muslim nation-states
utilize Islamophobia that is masked as anti-Islamist policies. Jonathan Brown (2016), the
Alwaleed bin Talal Chair of Islamic Civilization at Georgetown University, argues that, on a
global scale, “Islamism” often becomes the politically correct way to mark Muslims as
terrorists. In Brown’s analysis, Islamism is often assumed to be transnational and universal,
when Islamist movements emerge within and as a response to local political and social realities.
For example, the Saudi government’s militarized response to armed conflicts in Yemen and
Libya is a direct result of the emergence of Islamist groups in both countries. The militarized
Saudi response was justified using the rhetoric and language of the war on terror, successfully
evoking the stereotype of the dangerous, radical Muslim. Brown’s analysis proves the necessity
of placing the global and local formations of anti-Muslim rhetoric and linking anti-Muslim
practices and policies to overarching transnational and geopolitical structures. One cannot deny
that local Muslim communities in the global south are impacted by 9/11 and the mobilization of
the international community to eliminate the Muslim threat. For example, the Islamophobia
Somali Muslims experience is often dictated by their geographical location (Abdi, 2015).
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Therefore, any analysis of Islamophobia in the Somali-American immigrant experience must
account for the ways the “Somali terrorist” archetype has been constructed through American
foreign policy and the global war on terror. Global and local formations of anti-Muslim rhetoric
must be linked to Islamophobic practices and policies emanating from domestic and
transnational geopolitical structures. In other words, the Somali experience with Islamophobia
cannot be properly assessed without accounting for the impact of war on terror on Somalis,
both at home and abroad. While the supposed threat of Muslims did not directly create the
American surveillance state, the United States’ war on terror and its Islamophobic policies
galvanized and justified the expansion of the surveillance state (Murry, 2011).
Islamophobia and the Black Muslim Threat
Although the threat of the “Somali terrorist” has been a recent phenomenon,
historicizing the assumed threat of the Black Muslims uncovers historical and political accounts
that expose the ways Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness intersect. In “Common Heritage,
Uncommon Fear,” Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2013) trace the historical presence
of Islamophobia in the United States and British India from 1687-1947. Gottschalk and
Greenburg’s study indicates that the lack of recognizable Muslim presence in the United States
allowed the threats of “Mahometan” to be transferred into the American imagination by the
British panic over the 1857 Indian Revolt (Gottschalk and Greenburg, 2013). Similarly,
Edward E. Curtis IV (2013) traces America’s fear and loathing of Islam to the resurgence of
political Black Islam during the early periods of the twentieth century. Black Americans were
attracted to Islam’s redeeming and humanizing qualities, making Islam a vehicle for
inspirational progressive Black politics in the early parts of the twentieth century (Curtis 2013;
Jackson, 2009). Much like Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association,
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Muslim organizations like Moorish Science Temple, the Moslem Welfare Society and the
Nation of Islam (NOI) incorporated Black Nationalism and religion to uplift and advanced
Black communities. Such organizations empowered Black Americans through proclaiming
cultural pride and emphasizing on economic and social development of Black communities
(Curtis, 2013).
Edward Curtis, IV (2013), Professor of Religious Studies at Indiana University –
Purdue University Indianapolis, dissects the anatomy of state-sanctioned Islamophobia directed
at Black Muslims and grounds his analysis within the history of Black Muslims in America.
Curtis (2013) argues that the federal government perceived The Nation of Islam (NOI) and
Malcolm X as a threat to the republic with their Black Nationalist rhetoric, pan-Africanism, and
anti-imperialist politics. The federal government began tracking and eliminating “foreigninspired agitation among American Negroes” as Islam became intertwined with Black
Nationalism and resistance (Curtis, 2013). There are clear connections between the
demonization of Muslims, the emergence of blanket surveillance of Muslim subjects in
America, and the rise of politically active Black Islam that rejects America’s racial apartheid
(Curtis, 2013). Curtis’ “The Black Muslim Scare” provides a historical context that focuses on
the Anti-Black basis of state-sanctioned Islamophobia and its impact on shaping the early
configuration of the American surveillance state. By the 1930’s, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) began to monitor and gather intelligence on Black Muslim organizations
that were politically active in the larger project of Black liberation and resistance. Curtis (2013)
argues that the rise of Islam among Black Americans at the turn of the twentieth century is
essential to historicizing Islamophobia in the United States. The FBI poured enormous
resources to combat the rise of Islam among Black Americans, while the federal government
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labeled Islam as dangerous political ideology along with Black Nationalism and Marxism
(Curtis, 2013). The scale of tracking and neutralizing the Black Muslim threat to the United
States would not intensify until the end of War World II. With Edgar J. Hoover in charge of the
FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began its covert operation (nicknamed RACON),
which involved full surveillance on all forms of Black dissent. The FBI associated Black Islam
with foreign influences, particularly Marxist, anti-imperialist movements, and pro-Japanese
sentiment, which were deemed as anti-American. The American surveillance apparatus would
become especially fatal and potent in neutralizing dissent in the 1960s where Islamophobia
would form an integral part of FBI’s surveillance rationale and tactics. The FBI began a smear
campaign against NOI, Black Nationalist organizations, and New Left groups, and utilized its
counterintelligence program COINTELPRO to disrupt, misdirect and neutralize political
activities of Black Muslim organization and civil rights groups.
In a way, Islamophobia became a state policy to deal with an imaginary Muslim threat
that helped shape and manufacture America’s anxieties around Islam (Curtis, 2013). The
historical analysis of the state’s response to the Black Islam reveals the historical presence of
Islamophobia in the Black American Muslim experience. The historical entanglement between
Anti-Blackness and Islamophobia validates the inquiries made by this research into the
intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali immigrant experience.
Historicizing the paranoia around Islam exposes how Black Muslims have always been
assumed to be a danger to national security. Curtis’ nuanced analysis exposes the
entanglements of Anti-Black racism with state-sanctioned Islamophobia and surveillance of
Muslim subjects. The current paranoia and anxiety around Muslims reveal the persistence of
historical trends of constructing Muslims as a viable danger to national security that must be
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monitored and surveilled. This exposes the historical role of Anti-Blackness in producing and
institutionalizing Islamophobia, which complicates analysis on the intersections of
Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali immigrant experience.
Theorizing on State Surveillance
Although the tracking and historicizing the formations of the American surveillance
state are beyond the scope this literature review, tracing the transformation of the American
surveillance state in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks is essential to understand how Somali
Muslims' interactions with surveillance apparatuses are impacted by Islamophobia. In the
context of this research, surveillance simply means the gathering of intelligence (e.g. personal,
biometric information, etc.) whether that information was gathered by monitoring, harvesting
from personal devices, electronic records or through CCTV. In the introduction to the edited
collection of Feminist Surveillance Studies, Rachel Dubrofsky and Shoshana Magnet (2015)
define surveillance as the notion of watching real people without their knowledge or consent.
Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) conceive of surveillance as a systemic mechanism wherein
information is gathered to control, manage and manipulate subjects. Thus, state surveillance is
not only a mechanism of social control but invested in producing submissive, docile bodies.
The threat of terrorism has forced the United States to reformulate the pathos
surrounding national security and restructure its security policies and practices around its war
on terror. The emerging formulation of national security is situated within existing ideologies
of discipline and control that hinges upon the reproduction of docility and fortify the
government’s biopolitical powers (Murry, 2011). American officials exploited the surprise
element of the September 11 attacks to downplay the United States’ existing structures of
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surveillance, while demanding that legal and bureaucratic purviews be eliminated to increase
the state’s capacity to detect and neutralize terrorist threats (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005). It is
important to note that the United States had the ability to expand surveillance in the same
trajectory scholars have observed in the past decade; however, the expansion of what Nancy
Murry (2011) calls the “terrorism industrial complex” requires the normalization of
surveillance through fostering a climate of coercive transparency. The pervasiveness of
counter-terrorism climate links innocence and lack of guilt with becoming hyper-visible to the
watchful eye of the state and consenting to become transparent (Hall, 2015). The reconfigured
American surveillance apparatus produces a centralized form of surveillance that became
increasingly integrated into the government’s function. Thus, the American surveillance
apparatus transforms into a decentralized, synchronized, and coordinate effort wherein multiple
governmental agencies and organizations work to combine, integrate and deploy multifaceted
systems of surveillance (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005, p. 185). The political approval for mass
surveillance caused mechanisms of identity documentation to expand beyond birth registries,
passports, and biometric data to include body and retinal scans, thermal imagining, and facial
recognition technologies. Thus, the bureaucratic power of documentation gained the capacity to
turn the body or subject of surveillance inside-out.
While violation of privacy is a valid concern in the age of mass surveillance, feminists
have long argued that framing discussions of surveillance as a violation of privacy incapacitates
any possibility of critical and intersectional analysis of surveillance. Privacy concerns often
mask the hyper-focus of surveillance mechanisms to categorize bodies, and communities, as
either normal or deviant, which results in a gendered and racialized vision of the surveilled
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subject. As Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) mention in the introduction to Feminist Surveillance
Studies:
“state surveillance practices, which we might simply call state practices (since
surveillance is so seamlessly embedded), are processes that are simultaneously about
seeing and not- seeing—that is, some bodies are made invisible, while others are made
hyper-visible. […] whiteness is transparent—a racialization that does not require
monitoring—whereas racialized bodies are opaque and therefore suspect.” (Dubrofsky
and Magnet, 2015, pg. 7-8)
The visualization of the enemy within the American surveillance apparatus promoted
the need to produce undetectable weaponry that can provide the American regime an expansive
vision of the globe. Drones “appear to affirm the primacy of visual modalities of surveillance”
as well as retaining the technological capacities to sort surveilled subjects into categories and
proceed to neutralize subjects that are deemed suspicious or dangerous (Wall and Monahan,
2011, pg. 240). Optimizing the panoptical gaze, the indiscriminate deployment of drones
exemplifies the brutal, dehumanizing dimension of Islamophobia. As Tyler Wall and Torin
Monahan (2011) argue, the deployment of drones in civilian areas, borders, and other noncombatant settings facilitate the dehumanization and grouping of various people (e.g. armed
fighters and civilians) as targets. The indiscernibility of drones enabled the United States to
conduct covert military operations in Somalia and eliminate terrorist threats to the American
national security. As of 2013, the Somali death toll of drone strikes is estimated to be between
58-170 victims— most of whom are innocent civilians (Boyle, 2013). The indiscriminate
deployment of drone strikes amplifies the collective guilt of targeted victims, disabling any
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ethical obligations to victims of drone strikes, and enabling the United States to target anyone
and everyone with total impunity (Boyle, 2013).
After the 9/11 attacks, there has been a greater shift that pushed local and federal
agencies to focus more on the collection of intelligence and prevention of terrorist attacks. The
change generated financial support from the federal government to improve the intelligencegathering capacities of federal and local law enforcement agencies (Dubal, 2015). Thus, local
law enforcement agencies have become increasingly involved in state surveillance, which
focuses on the political profiling of certain groups and concentrating on non-criminal “suspect
behaviors” that do not specify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (Dubal, 2015). A
powerful surveillance mechanism has been community outreach programs such as Counter
Violent Extremism that are used as covert surveillance operations to collect data on Muslim
communities (Shahabuddin, 2015). Deploying a feminist approach to surveillance will reveal
the complex Islamophobic and Anti-Black contingencies CVE’s surveillance operates within to
unmask the dangerous intersections of Anti-Blackness, Islamophobia, and surveillance in the
Somali Muslim experience.
Conclusion
A feminist approach to surveillance studies entails that we recognize the state’s interest
in controlling problem bodies— or those who do not fit into the norm of white, middle-class,
able-bodied male— and the ways in which surveillance is a tool to maintain and protect the
existing system of oppression and inequality. Also, how the prevailing systems of oppression
render inequalities invisible and undetectable. However, systems of state surveillance make
problem bodies, or those who need to be surveilled and controlled, visible while other bodies
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become invisible; therefore, state surveillance often targets marginalized and disenfranchised
groups (Dubrofsky & Magnet, 2015). Surveillance studies must extend beyond concerns over
privacy, which obfuscate how systems of oppression and social inequality are reproduced vis-àvis surveillance thereby limiting the depth and rigor of critical analysis on surveillance
(Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). A feminist approach to surveillance is, by design and principle,
intersectional, as surveillance is often integral to the function and deployment of systems of
oppression (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015) given the efficacy of surveillance in controlling and
disciplining entire communities as well as individuals (Ali, 2016). There is a pressing need to
reframe the conversation on state-sanctioned surveillance against Muslim subjects that is
inclusive of the Black Muslim experience. Utilizing an intersectional lens is key to producing
nuanced analysis that can grapple with complexities the Somali immigrant experience. Legal
and social resistance to state-sanctioned surveillance often centralizes “Muslim” identity
categories as a precursor to political profiling. However, surveilling apparatus is a direct
response to unwarranted fear and anxiety around Muslims; a nexus of racialized, gendered and
classed perceptions that govern and influence official response. The literature review
demonstrates the exposure of Somali immigrant to state surveillance and monitoring. The low
socioeconomic position, reliance on state-funded social welfare services and the segregated
nature of Somali communities in Minnesota compounds its vulnerability to state surveillance
and limits its agency to resist measures such as CVE programs.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This thesis is particularly concerned with what Gary Marx (1984) calls “hidden and
dirty data,” or information that has been kept secret at structural level, which reveals
institutional failure, illegal behavior, and the miscarriage of justice and due process (pg. 79).
The “dirty data” in question are records regarding a multi-agency initiative called Counter
Violent Extremism (CVE) programs that are implemented in various Muslim communities
across the country. CVE programs are designed to identify and prevent the radicalization of
American Muslims by encouraging community members to categorize young people as
potential terrorists (Brennan Center v. DHS & Department of Justice, 2016). Consequently, this
study will undertake the task of assessing whether Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia are
apparent in the development and deployment of Counter Violent Extremism programs. The
objective of the research necessitates an active engagement with fragmented and extensive sets
of information to produce a coherent illustration of the structure, function, and implication of
CVE programs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota area. I will be assembling fragmented
data into an intelligible body of information utilizing rhetorical and literary analysis of the state
documents to identify thematic trends and patterns in the “dirty data.” Different pieces of
information will be gathered, analyzed and combined to reveal a complex and expansive
illustration of CVE programs. Piecing disparaging, incomplete and redacted pieces of
information from various declassified government documents is meant to bypass the structural
and bureaucratic limitations imposed on my research by state agencies as well as the inability
of researchers to develop a systemic approach to collect data using the Freedom of Information
Act. The information is later re-assembled and contextualized within the theoretical framework
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of this research to piece together and transform innocuous pieces of information into a nuanced
and complex account on the nature of state surveillance vis-à-vis CVE programs.
Academics and researchers have longed petitioned and sued governmental agencies to
obtain access to classified documents to resist the state’s power to deny and restrict the
disclosure of government documents (Yeager, 2012). State agencies are required to protect both
dirty and clean data for multiple reasons that include: benign bureaucratic regulations, privacy
protocols, and the cover-up of corruption and legal violations (Marx, 1984). Historically, state
agencies that are invested in protecting “dirty data” either withhold information from the public
or silence citizens who, otherwise, retain the right to free speech (Jaffer, 2010). Mixing various
analytical methods in the research process is a creative solution to the lack of governmental
transparency and the bureaucratic obstacles researchers face in obtaining classified records
(Hameed and Monaghan, 2012). The development of flexible methodological strategies that
adapt to the contentious and restricted access to governmental agencies will allow researchers
to undermine and subvert the full bureaucratic process, which restricts access to state records
and documents. “Dirty data” is an appropriate and productive site, for researchers, to
interrogate existing inequalities and inform, not only the research itself but also broader social
politics.
Methods
I began the research process by obtaining government documents about CVE programs
from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Department of Homeland Security.
The ACLU is a legal nonprofit organization that prides itself on being the guardians of
American liberty (ACLU, 2016). The ACLU filed several lawsuits against the United States
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under the Freedom of Information Act to access classified state documents about CVE
programs. The ACLU published declassified CVE documents, obtained via FOIA, on its
official website. Keyword searches such as “CVE program,” “CVE Minneapolis St. Paul,” and
“CVE program Somali” were used to find relevant documents. Official records and press
releases, such as the White House’s CVE Strategic Implementation Plan, that detail the
strategy, intent, and function of CVE programs were obtained from the DHS official CVE
Resource website. Additionally, articles and announcements about Minnesota’s CVE pilot
program were acquired from the official web page of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Additional media content was included to assess Somali community’s response to CVE
programs. I used news database LexisNexis to gather relevant news articles that reported on
how the Somali community responded to the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN.
Keyword searches such as “CVE program,” “CVE Minneapolis St. Paul,” and “CVE program
Somali” were used to find relevant news articles. Of all obtained documents, articles and media
content, declassified FOAI documents about the Minneapolis-St. Paul CVE pilot programs and
official CVE press releases from the DHS were prioritized. Supplementary FOIA documents
such as intelligence reports, federally commissioned research reports, program assessment
reports, and heavily redacted documents were examined as well.
The first round of analysis reviewed the official, declassified CVE documents,
prioritizing documents focusing on Minnesota. Gathered data, from the initial review, was later
used to create a description of CVE programs, which detailed official strategy of CVE
programs, planning process, and implementation process, and expected outcomes. In the
second round of review, supplementary FOIA and DHS documents were examined to construct
a cohesive understanding of CVE program’s function and deployment beyond sanitized official
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statements. For instance, supplementary documents revealed that CVE community intervention
model was built on the Department of Justice’s gang-intervention models— something that was
absent from official press releases. Additionally, examining supplementary documents revealed
the rationale that influences and informs CVE strategy. Research findings from the first two
rounds of the review were coded and cataloged through developed categories of discursive and
thematic trends, which were informed by the literature review. For example, the state’s decision
to focus its counterterrorism efforts on Somali youth was contextualized within the dominant
narrative of Somalis as natural-born terrorists, which was born out of the global war on
terrorism. The project’s analysis on the impact and interconnectedness of Islamophobia and
Anti-Black racism within CVE’s soft surveillance expanded on literature review findings, while
accounting for the material conditions and realities of Somali immigrants. Then, the results
were analyzed and contextualized through established theoretical frameworks. For example,
modeling of CVE’s targeted-intervention program after gang-intervention models takes on a
different meaning when placed in conversation with the finding of the literature review.
Surveyed scholarship discussed how Somali immigrants are racialized as Black, which entails
that analysis of CVE’s targeted-intervention model must be contextualized within the history of
over-policing Black communities. This reveals how the threat of the Black Muslim is
constructed within the rationale and function of CVE programs.
Applying Jenny Sharpe’s (1993) concept of truth effects, or the ability of discourse to
reconstruct non-sustained truth into a reality, I will be reassembling diverging pieces of
information to fill gaps that exist in scholarship and the collected data. For example, I will be
building on existing scholarship on the criminalization of Black people and immigrants, which
are often treated as two separate processes, to theorize on the criminalization of Somalis as
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Black, Muslim immigrants. In her research, Sharpe notes how British colonialism discursively
produced the construct of the dark-skinned Indian rapist as a response to the unexpected
Mutiny Rebellion of 1857. According to Sharpe, the Mutiny Rebellion transformed the colonial
stereotype of the “mild Hindu” into a savage rapist, despite the lack of evidence, to allow
British colonial project to consolidate its authority and justifying its imperial project in the
Indian subcontinent. The purpose of examining the discursive and thematic patterns of the
obtained CVE related documents is to analyze how the social construction of the Muslim
terrorist threat informs the function and deployment of CVE programs. As Jonathan GithensMazer (2012) argues in “The Rhetoric and Reality: Radicalization and Political Discourse,” the
current discourse on radicalism “are based on an emotional response to the shock of 9/11 and
the subsequent securitization of Islam” to explain Muslim’s inherent violent propensity against
the West (pg. 557). Thus, Islam and Muslims have become synonymous with phrases such as
terrorism, fundamentalism, radicalization, jihad, etc.
Jeffrey Monaghan’s (2014) study and analysis of Combating Violent Extremism
Working Group (CVEWG), a network of eighteen governmental departments and agencies in
Canada, concluded that such projects have an immense impact on the production of knowledge
about Islam and radicalization. Such projects develop “discursive structures,” or frameworks or
ideas that inform and dictates how individuals grasp and comprehend what radicalization
entails. Those discursive structures underpin the practices of projects such as CVEWG that
dedicate the tone and direction of radicalization discourse, and scholarship. Therefore, such
projects utilize what Monaghan calls “security traps” where security experts and government
officials use academic scholarship to construct possible threats to the safety of the nation to
expand the power and reach of surveillance apparatus. Thus, by controlling the knowledge
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production and dissemination of information surrounding national security, government
officials can provoke fear by constructing an imaginary scheme as a tangible reality.
“[…] Security traps affirm the authority of security experts to define and manage the
terrain of legitimate knowledge surrounding various sources of social threat(s) and
unease, resulting in a narrowly constructed domain of freedoms whereby iterations of
potential threat can only be understood and/or addressed through co-referent mechanisms
of security.” (Monaghan, 2014, pg.19)
Deconstructing and contextualizing the documents obtained by the ACLU and Brennan
Center will allow this research to assess whether security traps inform the function and
practices of CVE programs. Also, examining the apparent discursive structures in the obtained
documents can illuminate on the possible ways radicalization discourse and the war on terror
intersects with Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali Muslim experience with
CVE programs. A cohesive critical analysis of the language and rationale of CVE programs
will expose how Somali Muslims are perceived to be sources of radical extremism and viable
threat to the United States’ national security.
Positionality
Feminist research is inherently connected and materialized through feminist struggle.
The political nature of feminist research enables it to challenge systems and structures of
oppression by applying the findings of feminist research “in the service of promoting social
change and social justice” for the marginalized and oppressed (Brooks, 2007, pg.4). As a
feminist project, I emphasize the importance of interlinking epistemology, and methodology in
informing how data is collected and analyzed (Brooks, 2007). Through feminist theory,
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postcolonial theory, and the feminist principle of intersectional research and analysis, I will
situate this research within the appropriate political, historical and social context, which
interrogates the need for surveillance mechanisms such as CVE programs. Whereas feminist
surveillance studies often focus on the capacity of surveillance technologies to regulate and
control bodies and spaces, the theoretical frameworks stated above will enable this project to
also interrogate power relation and social formations of inequality in relation to CVE programs.
By accounting for histories of imperialism, colonization, patriarchy and Anti-Black racism, a
coherent analysis of the possible Islamophobic and Anti-Black dimensions of CVE programs
can be produced.
In her book Decolonizing Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues that
feminist research must be situated within the realities of the oppressed and the marginalized.
Additionally, indigenous and marginalized researchers must ground their academic work within
specific historical, political and social contexts that form their intersectional identities (Smith,
1999). As a Black Somali immigrant, I am directly impacted by the formation of the American
surveillance apparatus and the ongoing criminalization of Muslims in the War on Terror. While
the lived experiences of communities subjugated to state surveillance vary based on factors of
gender, race, class, ethnicity, immigration status, and sexuality, being a Black Muslim means
that I am primarily concerned with the influence of Anti-Blackness in the state’s surveillance
practices against Black Muslim communities. With the systemic and continuous disregard for
the Black Muslim experience, the lack of academic research on the intersections of
Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness and the possible rise of a totalitarian American regime, this
project has become is deeply personal and political. Feminists have long utilized positionality
as an epistemological tool to critique and decenter positivist scientific assumption about
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researcher’s neutrality and objectivity (Tsantili and Topini, 2015). By asserting my position as
a Black, Somali Muslim researcher, I am forcefully announcing that our struggles, as Black
Muslims, cannot be ignored both by the academy and feminist activism. As Patricia Hill
Collins (1990) argues in Black Feminist Thought, knowledge production is inherently linked to
the gendered, racialized and classed position of individuals or groups. As such, this research is
an attempt to create a space for the Black Muslim experience within the emerging discourse
and research on surveillance (Hill Collins, 1986).
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Chapter 4: Analysis
CVE in Minnesota: “Building Community Resilience”
Minnesota’s pilot CVE program, which began in 2015, retained the core vision,
function, and strategy of the White House’s CVE strategic implementation plan. Official
documents and narrative reuses the White House’s language and rhetoric, which stresses the
importance of community outreach and developing localized targeted-intervention models.
However, the Minnesotan CVE model distinguishes itself by expanding on existing community
outreach programs to obtain the input of community members (Building Community
Resilience, 2015). In the “Building Community Resilience” factsheet, which was presented at
the White House CVE Summit in 2015, Minnesota officials provided an overview of the
Minneapolis-St. Paul CVE pilot program (Building Community Resilience, 2015). They
outlined the program's strategy and the development of a localized action plan to address
homegrown Somali violent extremism. In the Building Community Resilience” factsheet,
public officials singled out extremism trends within the Somali community as their primary
concern and cited the increased number of radicalized Somali-American youth as the
justification for the singular focus on Somalis. The factsheet also cited the well-being and
safety of Somali communities as motivation to take an active stance against Minnesotan
homegrown terrorism. Minnesota public officials revealed efforts such as the hiring of Somali
law enforcement officers, participation in Community Advisory Committee meetings, and
developing educational and recreational youth programs. The goals of these activities were to
foster a community partnership between public safety agencies and the Somali community.
BRC fact sheet specified that DHS, FBI, St. Paul Police Department, Minneapolis Police
Department, and Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office will capitalize on their “long history of
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effective community outreach [and] solid foundations of trust” with the Somali community to
build and establish the pilot program (Building Community Resilience, 2015, pg. 1).
In the process of constructing CVE pilot programs in, law enforcement and the office of
the U.S. Attorney began holding various meetings with a diverse coalition of Twin Cities
Community members and leaders in early 2014. Religious leaders, mental health professionals,
parents, youth leaders, and victims of recruitment were invited to CVE community meetings.
Additionally, CVE partners in the Minneapolis-St. Paul school systems, nonprofit organizations
serving the Somali community, interfaith organizations, and members of local government
were invited to said meetings. The meetings focused on outlining the concerns of the Somali
community and the causes of radicalization, as well as possible solutions to homegrown Somali
extremism. According to public officials, an action plan was formulated based on the input
collected from CVE community meetings. The officials created a partnership with community
leaders to develop two intervention models that enable community members and leaders to
identify and respond to early signs or stages of radicalization. Public officials emphasize the
collective and communal dimension of Minneapolis-St. Paul’s CVE program, positing it as a
cornerstone to combat terrorism (Building Community Resilience, 2015).
During the White House CVE Summit, public officials released “Building Community
Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program: A Community-led Local Framework,” a
comprehensive report on BCR Factsheet that outlined the framework and strategy for the CVE
pilot program. The “Building Community Resilience” report shared the findings of a
stakeholders meeting with the Somali community and local partners, which were conducted in
the early stages of planning Minnesota’s CVE strategy. Minnesota officials reviewed the
available literature on radicalization while seeking the input of experts to identify root causes of
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radicalization among Somali youth. They argued that “disaffected youth; a deepening
disconnect between youth and religious leaders; internal identity crisis; community isolation;
lack of opportunity— including high employment, lack of activities for youth, and few
mentors” increase Somali youths’ vulnerability to violent extremism (Building Community
Resilience, 2015, pg. 3). What is clear from the BCR factsheet is that “strategic partnerships”
with various community organizations and leaders are an essential component of CVE
programs. The “strategic partnership” will give the state access to spaces that might have been
beyond the reach of federal and local law enforcement agencies. This increases the risk of CVE
programs becoming sites of surveillance and intelligence-gathering. While the impact of CVE
pilot program on Somali Muslims is yet to be determined, the incorporation of community
organization and services into the CVE enterprise might exacerbate social and economic
inequalities Somali immigrants face in Minnesota. As demonstrated by this chapter, combating
a non-existing threat of Somali terrorism diverts valuable efforts and resources away from
addressing disparities in Somali Muslims’ socioeconomic condition, while stigmatizing and
criminalizing the community.
The Urban Terrorist: Merging Counterterrorism and Anti-Gang Policing
The existing anti-radicalization models used by CVE programs are built on anti-gang
initiatives developed within the St. Paul – Minneapolis community that reinforce the
criminalization of Somalis. This strategy is demonstrated by declassified documents that
directly compare urban gang activity to the process of terrorist radicalization. Among the
documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the ACLU published a
thesis completed by Jeffery Jones (2010) at the Naval Postgraduate School that focuses on best
practices to circumvent Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of Somali youth. Al-Shabaab successfully
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recruited numerous Somali-Americans after an aggressive recruitment campaign that
capitalized on intense Somali nationalist rhetoric, which emerged during the Ethiopian
occupation of Somalia in 2006 (CREATE, 2016). Jones’ thesis was classified by the DHS as an
intelligence and analysis report that might have been used to inform the strategies and
approaches the United States took to implementing CVE agenda and programming. The
inclusion of Jones’ research in the declassified documents regarding CVE programs
exemplifies the growing shift within national security scholarship to utilize existing models of
community-oriented solutions to address criminal behavior. The White House Summit on CVE
programs, the “Building Community Resilience” report and the first official CVE strategy
“Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” all revolve
around the idea of targeted-prevention, or focusing on individuals on the path of radicalization.
The reliance on existing anti-gang models provides a cheap alternative for law makers, federal
and, local law enforcement agencies since existing scholarship and polices are repurposed to
inform future counter violent extremism policies and programs.
In “Countering Islamic radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment Within the Ethnic
Somali Population of the United States,” Jones states that his thesis is concerned with the threat
radicalized Somali youth pose to American national security. Jones (2010) argues that within
homegrown Somali extremism, “many of the causative socioeconomic factors are nearly
identical to those at the root of the decades-old problem of youth gang formation in the United
States” (Jones, 2010, pg. 3). Jones (2010) builds on erroneous assumptions that gang
involvement and terrorism involvement occur within similar processes to extrapolate best CVE
practices from public safety strategies that address gang recruitment and violence. In popular
research and scholarship, radicalization if often presented as a mutated renovation of gang
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recruitment, and this framing is becoming increasingly popular due to the increased
involvement of teenagers and young adults in extremist activities (Vidino and Hughes, 2015).
The perceived similarities between gangs and terrorist organizations, regarding recruitment and
engagement, nourishes the fallacy that examining radicalization utilizing youth gang research
methods and theory can yield an informative analysis on radicalization and violent extremism.
Gangs are formed on a continuum— some are hierarchical and highly organized, while other
gang formations are chaotic and disorderly— and understanding the various organization
structure of gangs is important (Borum, 2011). Decker and Pyrooz contend that the
organizational structure for organized crime groups, which includes terrorist groups and human
trafficking rings, are less hierarchal and more horizontality structured, while street gangs are
less formal with fluid structure (Borum, 2011). However, research on radicalization into violent
extremism lacks the conceptual and theoretical clarity that can accurately differentiate between
structure and hierarchies of gangs and terrorist organizations. For example, youth gangs’
structural models are assumed to follow traditional structural hierarchies, while terrorist groups
are deemed as “networked” (Borum, 2011). Nonetheless, researchers habitually label both
street gangs and terrorist groups as networked without accounting for the extent of how gangs
and terrorist organizations are structured and arranged (Shapiro, 2005).
Moreover, the theoretical application of criminology and youth gang formation to
understand violent extremism is inappropriate as it fails to account for nuances and difference
in hierarchies, structures, and assembling of terrorist organization. Additionally, criminology
does not account for the social and political context in which terrorism emerges from. In “The
Geometry of Terrorism,” Donald Black (2004) argues that terrorism is a collective, morally
inspired crime that is conceived as a social response to address and handle grievances. Black’s
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approach to theorizing about the evolution of radicalization into violent extremism relies on
sociological methodology and theories of social control. Terrorist organizations are well
organized covert collectives that practice guerilla warfare (e.g. launching attacks from
hideouts). Classifying the formation, structure, and practices of terrorist organizations as
similar to street and drug gangs “obscures its sociological identity and obstructs its scientific
understanding” (Black, 2004, pg. 17). The convergence of national defense agendas and
international security gives rise to this specific strain of research. Due to the moral panic after
the attacks of September 11, Politicians, military leaders and security experts emphasized the
globalization of crime and terrorism to encourage collaboration between nation states.
However, the assumed globalization of crime and terrorism obliterates distinctions between
various constellations of criminal and extremist activity (Bigo, 2006). Moreover, the lack of
clarity in theoretical tools and methodologies used to understand radicalization— as well as
concepts such as extremism and terrorism— is compounded by the ambiguity of the concept of
radicalization itself. There is no consensus on the meaning of radicalization and definitions are
produced based on perceived political ideology and social context in which radicalization
occurs. There are multiple definitions of radicalization, ranging from the religious movements
towards extremism to the process of acquiring radical beliefs, to the movement away from
mainstream society. As Numann argues, radicalization can only be understood within the
context of what constitutes “normal” or “mainstream” in each political and economic context
(Numann, 2013, pg. 875). Within the United States, radicalization is exclusively understood as
acquiring radical, Islamic beliefs and said radicalization is often assumed to result in violence
(Numann, 2013).
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The discrepancies in the use of criminology to understand violent extremism begs the
question of why do CVE programs utilize gang formation theory to understand the
radicalization of Somali Muslim youth in Minneapolis-St. Paul? First, I would argue that the
use of gang intervention model is both strategic and cost-effective for federal law enforcement
agencies. Due to the complexities and variable nature of radicalization— as a social
phenomenon— large, nationally-scaled preventative programs are costly and ineffective. As a
result, the individualized nature of anti-gang intervention models provided a cost-effective
alternative, which enables law enforcement agencies to measure the success of CVE initiatives,
whatever the definition of success may be. Additionally, relying on criminology enables local
and federal law enforcement agencies to position CVE initiatives as public safety measures.
Using “safeguarding” language, officials reframe radicalization as an issue akin to gang
recruitment, drug use and pedophilia, which encourages community members to take on the
onus of monitoring and reporting vulnerable and at-risk youth. Presenting counter extremism
propaganda as comprehensive, multi-pronged solutions to radicalization establishes a level of
credibility with the targeted community. By creating unfounded links between radicalization
and socio-economic problems (Aldrich, 2012) faced by Muslim communities, state officials
and law enforcement agencies normalize the overt infiltration of state agents and informants in,
almost, every aspect of Muslim Americans daily lives. With the lack of definite and factual
profiles of radicalization, communities are encouraged to report any, and all, perceived changes
in individuals, inciting the racial profiling and suspicion of Muslims. Reconstructing CVE
framework within existing “public safety” strategies of law-and-order policing and stringent
anti-gang protocols broadens the span and scope of CVE’s surveillance apparatus.
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The lack of cohesive and scientifically accurate research on radicalization (Neumann
and Kleinmann, 2013) expedited the adoption of anti-gang policing models for domestic
counterterrorism policies and practices. Interestingly, anti-gang policing, which emerged from
the 1980’s and 1990’s war on drugs, lacked a stable and cohesive definition of what constitutes
a “gang” (Rosich, 2007). In the absence of a tangible definition of “gang,” anti-gang policing
initiatives profiled large numbers of young men and women of color as suspecting gang
members without merit or proof. The American Sociological Association’s report on the
American criminal justice system revealed that by 1992, “almost half of all Black men ages 21
to 24 in Los Angeles county were identified […] as ‘gang’ members, and in Denver, Black
young men between ages 12 and 24, who were 5 percent of the city’s population, made up 57
percent of the police department’s list of suspected ‘gang’ members” (Rosich, 2007, pg. 7).
Policing practices associated with the “war on drugs” led to discriminatory and targeted forms
of policing against Black communities in the United States (Bass, 2001; Burnson, 2007;
Brunson and Miller, 2006). The emergence of the neoliberal carceral state entails that poor
Black communities are increasingly managed and governed as criminals (Wacquant, 2010) and
subjugated to aggressive Anti-Black forms of policing and surveillance (Rosich, 2007). As
such, adopting theories and practices of anti-gang policing into counterterrorism programs and
practices targeting the Somali community in the Twin Cities, who are already over-policed
(Abdi, 2012), raises concerns around racial profiling and criminalization of Somali Muslims.
Given that law-and-order policing informs the ways in which Black criminality is reinforced
and inscribed on Black communities, institutionalizing Anti-Black forms policing, such as antigang initiative, within the function and deployment of CVE programs demonstrates how the
criminalization of Somalis is at the heart of domestic counterterrorism efforts in Minnesota.
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CVE propaganda and literature correlates the poverty of Somalis to their susceptibility
to radicalization (Jones, 2010; CREATE, 2016). For example, Jones (2010) argues that poverty
and the presence of gangs in Somali neighborhoods cause Somali youth to be more susceptible
to radical extremism. Jones’ statement recycles mainstream discourse on gang prevention,
which often explains criminal behavior as personal pathology born out of poverty and
depravity. “Culture of poverty” is an example of dog-whistle politics, or racially coded political
messages, which posits the defectiveness of culture, ethnicity, and nationality as the origin of
criminal behavior (Mills, 2008). Fear and anxieties surrounding the criminality and violent
radicalism of Somalis dictate how law enforcement agencies police within and around Somali
communities. The scripts of criminalizing Somali youth are pre-existing within racial
stereotypes that interlink Black masculinities with criminality and violence. Synonymizing
Blackness and criminality provides justification for discriminatory targeting and policing of
Black men in the United States. For example, Jesse Mills (2008) details the moral panic of the
San Diego Police Department around recently formed Somali gangs with "full blown criminal
enterprises," which, supposedly resulted in "spikes in certain crime" (pg. 73). The two newly
formed Somali gangs in the suburbs of San Diego had less than twenty members in a city of
15,000 people (Mills, 2008). Similarly, Somali teenagers in Minnesota reported numerous
experiences of racial profiling, discrimination, and Islamophobia by law enforcement officials
and teachers (Bigelow, 2008). The racialization of Somalis as Black in conjunction with the
portrayal of Muslims as barbaric, violent extremists compounds the marginalization of Somali
youth.
The merger between anti-gang policing and counterterrorism in the rationale, function
and deployment of CVE programs in Minnesota demonstrates how Islamophobic rhetoric
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around Somali Muslims is passed over and imposed through existing infrastructures of lawand-order policing that criminalizes Black communities. Somali terrorism is closely linked with
pathological assumptions about Black criminality as rhetoric that racializes and criminalizes
poverty is increasingly used to inform domestic counterterrorism practices and policies. In
“Disclaimed or Reclaimed? Muslim Refugee Youth and Belonging in the Age of
Hyperbolisation,” Dr. Cawo Abdi (2015), an Assistant Professor at the University of
Minnesota, reports examples of police brutality, violence, and abuse against Somali youth in
Minneapolis-St. Paul area. A social worker recounts how Twin Cities law enforcement officers,
for example, created an unofficial database— a Black binder— of supposed Somali gang
members by taking random photos of Somali youth in their neighborhoods. The “Black binder”
policy, according to the Twin Cities Daily Planet, transformed into a gang database, where
“documented” gang members are included indefinitely. Some of the Black binder’s problematic
inclusion criteria were: being photographed with “known” gang members, hanging out with
“known” gang members and using gang-related symbols and hand signals (Charles Hallman,
2009). The generic and subjective gang database inclusion criteria mirrors the AMICOP’s
absurd method of identifying “radicalized” Somali youth through including individuals who
refused or failed to participate in AMICOP’s Police Athletic League or other YWCA sponsored
programs and individual who declined to cooperate with police requests and entrapment
schemes (Prince, 2015). The AMICOP’s database, SPPD’s gang database and Minneapolis
PD’s informal “Black binder” were possibly incorporated within CVE’s surveillance apparatus.
Law enforcement agencies’ anti-gang and counterterrorism modes of policing targeted,
criminalized and racially profiled Somali immigrants, while obscuring its intrusive surveillance
and intelligence-gathering practices. The suspect-less, Islamophobic targeting of Somali
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Muslims through counterterrorism initiatives impersonates forms of racialized policing Somali
Muslims have historically experienced in the Twin Cities and further demonizes Somali
immigrants. Building on a decade-long ethnographic study of Somali communities, both in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul and internationally, Dr. Caw Abdi (2015) traces public debates about
immigrants and radicalization with regards to the Somali diaspora. Examining the impact of
gang-related violence on Somali men, Abdi argues that radicalization discourse not only
criminalizes Somali youth but normalizes the notion that violence is intrinsic to Somali
communities. Somali Muslims are pathologized through radicalization discourse that evokes
images of Black criminality and posits the Somali community as inherently criminogenic and
violent. Portraying Somali youth as prone to criminal behavior and violence provides the
necessary justification to over-police, monitor and surveil Somali Muslims via CVE programs.
In documents obtained by the Brennan Center through FOIA, the Saint Paul Police
Department’s Somali outreach program, which focused on combating gang activity, underwent
a major transformation. Through a two-year grant, SPPD’s community outreach program
expanded to focus on the radicalization of Somali youth alongside its gang prevention
programs. Thus, the Somali community outreach program was expanded and rebranded as
African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program or AMICOP. Official statements
regarding SPPD’s community outreach program presented the initiative as a continuum of the
department’s effort to combat violent crime and gang activity. However, AMPICOP’s program
narrative stipulates that the “radicalization of 20 youth from [the Minneapolis/St. Paul] area
who have left for Somali[a] to fight for the terrorist organization al Shabaab” must be a primary
concern for the program (Prince, 2015, pg. 5). AMICOP was also used to develop a database to
track at-risk Somali youth and allow law enforcement agencies to intervene directly. AMICOP
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touted a strict zero-tolerance policing where officers are encouraged to crackdown, surveil,
investigate, and interrogate at-risk Somali youth.
Additionally, the St. Paul Police Department submitted a 2007-2009 grant proposal to
target crime, gun violence, and gang activity. In the grant proposal, SPPD declare that the
department will be “Using established criteria that will stand up to public and legal scrutiny, the
SPPD will establish a list that identifies the BADDEST of the BUNCH (BOB) … to implement
an automated ‘flagging’ system . . . .” to track and document Somali gang members (Prince,
2015, pg. 6). As this report demonstrates, the criminalization and targeted law-and-order
policing of Somali youth in the Twin Cities area has been a salient and constant in the Somali
Muslim experiences before the emergence of CVE enterprise. Therefore, expanding the lawand-order policing of Somalis in the Twin Cities to encompass counterterrorism intelligencegathering exemplifies the entanglement of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia in the Somali
immigrant experience. Intrusive, illegal intelligence-gathering practices embedded in the
criminalization and policing of Somali youth via anti-gang programs functioned as the
foundational blueprint for CVE’s surveillance apparatus.
The merging of anti-gang initiatives and anti-radicalization strategies both rely on moral
panic around the Black Muslim threat to the United States. The criminality of Somalis is
constructed through exaggerated racialized, Anti-Black and Islamophobic stereotyping,
evoking the trope of the violent, irrational Somali terrorist. In “From Starving Child to RebelPirate: The West’s New Imagery of a ‘Failed’ Somalia,” Aman Sium (2012), from the
University of Toronto, argues that failed states narratives are discursive categories that inscribe
inferiority on bodies and communities of African countries by arguing that race determines
which political communities can successfully govern themselves. Failed state narratives
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associate Black nation-states with chaos, authoritarianism, economic disorganization, while
white nation-states are associated with fiscal responsibility, democracy, economic stability, and
wealth. Thus, failed state etches the inferiority and savagery of Black folk, implying that
African nations are incapable of self-governance. The Blackness of Somalis produces enduring
suspension and panic around the “Somali terrorist/criminal figure” (Sium, 2012). Failed state
logic necessitates that democratic, stable governments must intervene and facilitate the
transformation of failed state into civilized, modern nation-state. CVE enterprise evokes the
threat of the “Somali terrorist/criminal figure” by transporting and inscribed the qualities
associated with the nation-state of Somalia— such as chaos, instability, and violence— to its
citizens.
The AMICOP documents reveal how anti-gang policing practice such as identifying
and documenting “known” gang members converges with counterterrorism surveillance
practices. Moreover, the expansion of anti-gang Somali community outreach programs to
policing violent extremism accentuate the intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness in
the Somali immigrant experience. The moral panic around Black criminality, Islamic
radicalism, and the outlaw foreigner abated the convergence of Anti-Black policing and
Islamophobic reconnaissance. This early articulation of CVE-esque intelligence-gathering in
AMICOP expose the decentralized, networked nodes of the American surveillance apparatus
and how clandestine Islamophobic, xenophobic and Anti-Black operations are consolidated
within the perimeters of the neoliberal carceral state. While it is unknown if local law
enforcement conducted counterterrorism surveillance before 2007, the merging of local and
federal surveillance enterprise signifies a shift in the (in)visibility of Somalis’ racial and
religious identities.
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Prefacing Soft Surveillance
The concept of “soft surveillance” is often used to describe the coercive forms of
volunteerism within the national security apparatus that compel individuals to reveal personal
information to guarantee or protect their welfare. This section will examine the soft
surveillance dimension of CVE pilot program in the Twin Cities. The analysis will focus on the
existing intersections between soft surveillance and community policing within CVE’s
community outreach initiatives that grant the state adequate access to surveil targeted
communities while encouraging community members to perform the labor of surveillance.
Gary Marx (2005) argues that “soft” is facilitated through tactics such as: “persuasion to gain
voluntary compliance, universality or at least increased inclusiveness, and emphasis on the
needs of the community [over] the rights of the individual” (pg. 1). As a mechanism of social
control, soft surveillance is presented as a harmless and innocuous act, while valorizing
individual choice by rewarding and/or praising those who voluntarily share personal
information. A Muslim traveler might volunteer to undergo invasive illegal TSA security
measures to be perceived as a good citizen, while a suspect in a crime might voluntarily
provide authorities with a biometric sample (e.g., DNA) to obtain the benefits of cooperating.
Although Marx situates the potency and impact of soft-surveillance mostly within corporations
that collect and use personally identifiable information of its customers and/or users,
governments are increasingly utilizing soft-surveillance mechanisms that engineer people’s
decisions to produce compliant behavior (Kerr et. al, 2006).
Compliance is often interlinked with the notion of good citizenship where individuals
volunteer to share and allow law enforcement agencies— both physically and virtually— into
their private lives. In other words, good citizenship hinges upon transparency and the
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continuous supply of private information to the state in the form of an open-sourced alibi. A
good citizen would volunteer to be under the watchful eye of the state as a marker of good will
and innocence. Soft surveillance is driven by the notion that innocent individuals have nothing
to hide and thus should forgo the right to privacy (Marx, 2005). The work of CVE surveillance
is, thus, democratized and bureaucratized by requesting community leaders, teachers,
counselors, families, and friends to spot, identify and report radicalized and at-risk Somali
youth. Furthermore, CVE strategies cement soft surveillance by exploiting the socioeconomic
vulnerabilities, and the minimal access of poor communities to adequate social and support
services.
The Soft Surveillance of Community Outreach
Reframing social malaise and disparities faced by Somali Muslims as causes of
radicalization and violent extremism serves to encourage community members and strategic
partners to co-opt themselves into performing the labor of surveillance. The Minneapolis CVE
framework utilizes a community intervention model that creates a class of “community
volunteers” who work directly with Somali youth to prevent radicalization (Building
Community Reliance, 2015). CVE strategies normalize soft surveillance through community
outreach programs that encourage community members to disclose information about other
individuals to law enforcement agencies. In other words, community members, teachers,
counselors, social workers, and religious leaders effectively become informal informants who
are tasked with surveilling and monitoring Somali immigrants.
A leaked classified National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) document revealed a
rating system, created by the agency, that encourages law enforcement agents, teachers,
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counselors, coaches, healthcare providers and social service employees to evaluate the
vulnerability of any given Muslim to violent extremism. Titled: “Countering Violent
Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” the document encourages law
enforcement agencies and community members to focus on individual behaviors to rate “risk
and resilience factors” (CVE Guide for Practitioners, pg. 18, 2014). A similar pattern appeared
when the Minneapolis Public Schools, one the strategic partners of the CVE pilot in Minnesota,
was tasked with identify “at risk” Somali students attending public schools. Kourtney Kiernat,
the Executive Director of External Partnerships and Institutional Advancement at Minneapolis
Public Schools, announced that the city’s public schools would begin a CVE initiative to
monitor Somali youth during lunch break, in non-class environments and after-school programs
(C-SPAN, 2015). According to the Minneapolis Public Schools representative, local schools
trained “youth workers” from the community to monitor and spot potentially disaffected
Somali youth in places like the lunchroom, the classroom, and after school programs. This,
naturally, deepened the Somali community’s suspicion and anxiety around increased state
surveillance of Somali youth. The turn to surveil Somali youth demonstrates how the
criminalization of Somalis is deeply ingrained in public discourse and policy. The achievement
gap for Somali students in Minneapolis Public Schools is increasing as the school district fails
to meet the specific needs of Somali students. For example, the Minneapolis school district cut
funding for afterschool programs, which provided Somali students with additional tutoring and
academic support. Thus, only 11 percent of Somali students in the district met Minnesota’s
achievement standards (amatos122, 2014). Implicating Minneapolis Public Schools, a
somewhat segregated school district (Abdi, 2015), within the CVE’s surveillance apparatus
exposes the breadth of soft surveillance vis-à-vis community engagement. Additionally, this
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reveals how structural and discursive forms of oppression intersect to further criminalize and
alienate Somali Muslims, especially in the ways socioeconomic realities of being poor, Black,
inner-city residents, harsh policing and counterterrorism initiatives converge to produce a
distinct, yet all too familiar, experience of discrimination and othering.
The Minneapolis Public Schools CVE initiative is based on the same premise as the
NCTC risk assessment rating system, as well the general CVE strategy. Normal expressions of
teenage angst such as low self-esteem, hostility, and alienation are assumed to be indicators of
Somali youth’s vulnerability to violent extremism. For example, while Minneapolis Public
Schools workers will attempt to spot identity issues and dissatisfaction, the NCTC monitors
behaviors such as hopelessness, economic stress, and sense of victimization. In the same vein, a
low score obtained by an individual or a family indicates a vulnerability to violent extremism
and an intervention strategy is formulated based on an aggregated assessment of risk (CVE
Guide for Practitioners, 2014). Even though academic scholarship and research specify that risk
of radicalization cannot be predicted since radicalization is not a linear process (Patel and
German, 2015), the insistence of government agencies on utilizing baseless measurements for
radicalization reinforces the criminalization and the need for suspicion-less surveillance of
Somali Muslims. The Minneapolis Public Schools partnership with the CVE enterprise is a
testament not only to the ways the labor of surveillance has been diversified but on how softsurveillance is essential to CVE’s intent, function, and deployment. No longer does the state
need to deploy its own labor force to surveil mosques, covertly infiltrate Muslim spaces, target
Muslims or entrap them through informant-led terrorist plots. Similar to the way drones
bureaucratized political assassination and murder, enmeshing public school boards, civic
organizations, and social services providers expands circuits of surveillance and intelligence54

gathering while breaching defensive measures placed by the Somali community to evade the
watchful eye of the state. For example, Somali immigrants often avoid programs, organizations
and individuals they suspect to be involved in state-sanctioned intelligence-gathering schemes.
When the FBI recognized the leadership efforts of a known Somali nonprofit organization, Ka
Joog, the Somali community became increasingly suspicious of possible surveillance and
tracking of Somali students via the organization’s free after-school programs (Sazawal, 2016).
The function and implementation of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis-St. Paul
area follows a typical criminal justice approach to policing that uses an inverted model of
community policing where the labor of policing and monitoring possible criminal activities are
delegated to members of the community. Traditional models of community policing are
designed, in theory, to empower marginalized people to communicate with law enforcement
agencies about problems facing their communities (Aziz, 2014). In “Policing Terrorists in the
Community,” Sahar Aziz (2014), Professor of Law at Texas A&M University, points out that
CVE programs are defined differently by the state depending on the audience while the state
rebrands invasive and unconstitutional counter-radicalization dimension of CVE programs as
community engagement. For example, the Brennan Center obtained documents that
demonstrated that the FBI directed its field office in Minneapolis, in 2009, to use community
outreach programs directed at Somali immigrants for surveillance and intelligence gathering
purposes (Prince, 2015). Although the Minneapolis FBI field office resisted the order, anxieties
persist among Somalis even with the U.S. attorney signing a memorandum in 2012 assuring
Somali Muslims that the FBI will not use community outreach programs for surveillance and
intelligence-gathering (Sazawal, 2016). The promise is belied by intelligence documents that
suggest that CVE programs intentionally utilize community outreach programs for this purpose.
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The heavily redacted intelligence and analysis assessment “Empowering Somali [redacted] Key
for Countering Youth Radicalization and Their Travel Abroad for Terrorism” (2015), outlines
how federal and local law enforcement agencies increasingly outsource counterterrorism
obligations to community leaders, teachers, and social service workers, while holding various
kinds of interventions in private and communal spaces that are designated as “pre-criminal.” In
March of 2015, officials, in conjunction with religious leaders and social service
administrators, “sought to engage [redacted] who may be targeted by violent extremists in the
“pre-criminal space” to help these youths before they cross the line into significant terrorismrelated activities (Empowering Somali [redacted], 2015, pg. 7)”. Additionally, the report
contends that NGOs should provide “non-punitive” intervention services to Somali Muslims so
they can resist violent extremism. For example, a hotline was established in April of 2014 with
a “Somali language counseling services, to provide [redacted] an alternative to informing the
[redacted], which most are reluctant to do [redacted]. There are hotlines in [redacted] to field
calls from seeking advice, counseling, referrals, and other services to address potentially
radicalizing [redacted]” (Empowering Somali [redacted], 2015, pg. 7). The assessment report
provided an example of a private organization that works with law enforcement to counter
radicalization by providing counseling services, educational material, and interventions.
While the assessment report contends that such partnerships are forged to avoid
militarized tactics of counterterrorism such as raids, this CVE strategy enables the state to
deploy the public, private and nonprofit sectors in coordinated, networked and efficient manner
to surveil targeted communities. This pattern demonstrates that, in the context of CVE
strategies in Minnesota, federal and local agencies are not merely managerial and executory.
Rather, federal and local law enforcement agencies’ role is often restricted to organizing and
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arranging first respondents to any detected radicalization. As such, the role of law enforcement
agencies has been bureaucratized as the labor of surveillance, and monitoring has been
digitized and outsourced as advocacy-based social services. This networked approach to
intelligence-gathering and surveillance does not mean that the structure of the American
surveillance apparatus— and by extension, the government— has become decentralized.
Neoliberal economic policies that subcontracted social welfare services and public facilities to
corporations (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2001) created, what Professor of Criminology and
Criminal Justice at the University of Leeds Adam Crawford (2006), calls a post-regulatory
state, which is increasingly reliant on networked governance. Crawford argues that postregulatory governments engage in ambitious projects of social engineering that normalizes
interventionism, policing and behavioral control. The regulatory nature of the state as a
punitive government is obscured through plural policing— where the presence of policing
agencies is diluted through employing community support officers and third-party policing.
The success of post-regulatory governance lies within the networked connections between the
state and non-governmental entities, whether public, private, or civic (Crawford, 2006). The
suspect-less, Islamophobic surveillance of Somali Muslims in Minnesota necessitates
constructing infrastructures of networked, covert surveillance agents— both individuals and
entities— who perform the labor of intelligence-gathering. As such, the “hard” consequences of
CVE’s soft surveillance of Somali Muslims cannot be separated from the historical and
contemporary ways the U.S government punishes and criminalizes poor, Black people.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The "Hard" Consequences of CVE's Soft Surveillance
In the early evening of February 10th, 2015, an "ongoing" neighborly dispute resulted in
the death of Shaddy Barakat, Yusor Abu-Salha, and Razan Abu-Salha in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina. Chapel Hill police claim that the execution-style murder was motivated by a "parking
dispute," while further investigation into the killer's background reveals that Craig Stephan
Hicks was a staunch Islamophobe who bullied and targeted his neighbors before murdering
them in cold blood (Katz, 2015). Despite the obvious racist motivation behind the Chapel Hill
murders, national media outlets, which only began reporting on the story after a robust social
media campaign by Muslim activist and community leaders, whitewashed their reporting,
ignoring how anti-Muslim sentiment triggered the murders (Ose, 2015). The outrage over the
killings grew as hashtags #MuslimLivesMatter, and #ChapelHillShooting were trending
worldwide (Ose, 2015). Hundreds of Muslim American organizations signed a letter requesting
then Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate the murders as hate crimes, while the world
rallied behind Muslims in a rare show of solidarity and support (Mirza, 2015).
The outpouring of support and solidarity in the wake of the Chapel Hill murders stands
in contrast to the deafening silence and disregard to the death of Mustafa Mattan, which
occurred sixteen hours before the Chapel Hill murders. Mattan, a 28-year-old Somali-Canadian,
was killed in his home three weeks after moving into Fort McMurray (Hill, 2015). Mattan's
murder became a footnote in the greater narrative of the growing Anti-Muslim sentiment in the
West, as did the killings of Mohamedtaha Omar, Adam Mekki, and Muhannad Tairab in Fort
Wayne, Indiana, and the murder of 15-year-old Somali teen, Abdisamad Sheikh-Hussein, by a
known Islamophobe in Kansas City, Missouri. All were Muslims, but most importantly, all
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were Black (Mirza, 2015). This reflects tensions within the American Muslim community
where Black Muslims are pushed to the periphery and erased from issues and narratives that
impact American Muslims.
The curious case of selective mourning over the murdered Black Muslims reveals the
brutal and deadly cost of interlinking Islamophobia with, and only with, anti-Arab sentiment.
Muslims, united by Islamophobia and divided by Anti-Black racism, continue to erase the
existence and experiences of Black Muslims, not only from mosques and communal spaces but
from larger narrative and discourse. The erasure of Black Muslims (Karim, 2007), embodies
the binary nature of American racial hierarchy— where different categories of identities are
placed within a narrow, rigid range spanning between whiteness and Blackness— failing to
accommodate the diverse, and diverging identities present within Muslim communities. This
manifests itself within the academic scholarship on Islamophobia that focuses on the othering
and racialization of Muslims as foreign and brown. The immigration narrative at the heart of
the public and scholarly discourse on Islamophobia muddies how Anti-Black racism, police
brutality, mass incarceration, and poverty are inherently Muslim issues that impact at least onethird of the American Muslim community. For example, in the wake of Freddie Gray's death at
the hand of Baltimore police, The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) expressed its
concern over the escalation of violence, while failing to demand accountability from Baltimore
Police Department (MuslimARC, 2015). The selective Muslim outrage at the forms of statesanctioned violence Black Americans experience further disassociate the Black and Muslim
identities Somalis occupy.
In an era where fascist, white supremacist sentiments are becoming increasingly
normalized, accounting for the intersections of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia is essential
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for any meaningful and sustainable forms of resistance. The moral panic around Muslims in the
wake of Trump's “Muslim ban” intensifies the law-and-order policing and scrutiny by law
enforcement agencies. Consequently, it is likely that CVE programs will continue to explicitly
and exclusively focus on Muslims. For example, reports emerged in early March of this year
that Donald Trump wanted to make CVE programs exclusively focused on Islamic terrorism
and cease all CVE work around other forms of violent extremism such as white nationalist
groups. The repacking of CVE program to "Countering Islamic Radicalism," as intended by
Donald Trump (Ainsley, Volz and Cooke, 2017), will aggravate the surveillance and
discriminatory over-policing of Somali Muslims through CVE initiatives. CVE programs will
continue to criminalize, demonize and single-out Somali Muslims while violent extremism
becomes intimately and exclusively linked with the Somali community. Moreover, in an
increasingly Islamophobic America, the surveillance of Somali Muslims cannot be divorced
from the criminalization and mass surveillance of all Black communities and organizations
across the United States. From COINTELPRO to NYPD's Demographic Unit, which surveilled
Muslims across the state of New York, clandestine surveillance and monitoring of Muslims
evolved from Anti-Black forms of policing and social control (Browne, 2015; Curtis, 2013). As
demonstrated by this research, infrastructures, rationale and mechanisms of surveilling Somali
Muslims in the Twin Cities were born out of the criminalization and over-policing of Somali
communities.
By situating Islamic extremism as intrinsic and inherent to the Somali community, CVE
policies reinforces the "cultural distinctiveness," or ethnic difference, of Somalis. In this
context, the ethnic, religious and cultural identities of Somalis are presented as a basis for racial
difference, thereby essentializing their cultural and ethnic difference. This reveals how complex
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Anti-Black racist ideologies and Islamophobia underpin the demonization of Somalis.
Describing Somali immigrants as unassimilated and isolated implies that the lack of social
progress or mobility in the diasporic community is pathological and inseparable from their
Blackness and Muslim-ness. The insurgency and violence associated with Somalia's failed state
status are positioned as intrinsic qualities of Somalis. The vulnerability of Somalis to violent
extremism is measured by their proximity to Blackness and the designation of their country as
"a destination of those who are seeking to join the 'jihad' against the infidels, non-believers, and
apostates" (Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies, 2011, pg. 0921).
The cultural othering of Somalis demonstrates how Islamophobia can easily evolve and
grow out of Anti-Black sentiment. The equivalency between the Muslim terrorist figure and the
Black criminal figure is easily made through the supposed deviance, criminality and violence of
Somali Muslims. During an election rally in Minneapolis, MN, then presidential candidate
Donald Trump stated that Somali Muslims are "joining Isis and spreading their extremist views
all over our country and all over the world" (Jacobs and Yuhas, 2016). Trump's irrational fear
of Somalis would later manifest itself in an executive order, which banned the entrance of
Somalis to the United States along with immigrants from six other Muslim majority countries.
The executive order is an extension of the United States' long history of discriminatory mass
deportation of African immigrants and Black Muslim. Immigrants from African and Caribbean
decent with criminal convictions are twice more likely to deported compared to other racial and
ethnic groups. In a study conducted by The Black Alliance for Just Immigration, "76% of Black
immigrants were deported on criminal grounds, in contrast to [sic] 45% overall, 38% of Asian
immigrants, 47% of South American immigrants and 54% of European immigrants" (Feltz,
2016). The propensity of the American government to deport African and Black immigrants is
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aligned with the state's tendency to target Black Americans through law-and-order policing and
state-sanctioned violence. Since issuing the Muslim ban, the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is in the process of deporting 4,000 Somalis (teleSUR, 2017). The Muslim
Ban reveals how Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness intersect to aggravate the vulnerabilities of
Black Muslims from Sudan and Somalia and other banned countries.
The insidious forms of Islamophobic violence and Anti-Black state-sanctioned violence
continue to fracture the energies and priorities of Somali Muslims. Somali Muslims struggle
with being invisible in Muslim spaces that situate themselves as largely Arab and South Asian,
while being hypervisible to the state vis-à-vis CVE's soft surveillance. The first and most
important step to resisting the consequences of the Muslim ban and suspect-less surveillance of
Somali Muslims is to acknowledge the historical and contextual complexities of being Black,
immigrant and Muslim. American Muslim communities must pull from historical memory and
lived experiences of Black Americans to appropriately reframe, not only the conversation
around Islamophobia, but the means, forms, and agenda of Muslim resistance. The erasure of
Black Muslims within American Muslim communities must be confronted. In Muslim occupied
spaces, especially places of worship, race does not exist; Blackness is drained of the contested
meanings that arise when a melanin rich body enters a mosque. It is in this context that African
American Muslims feel marginalized within the American Muslim community (Karim, 2007).
Towards a Framework of Black Muslim Resistance
What can Somali Muslims do to address the experience of Anti-Black marginalization
within Muslim communities, and both racist and Islamophobic policing? The Somali
community is marred with significant achievement gaps in education, unemployment, housing
and incarceration (Abdi, 2014) and much of the funding Somali-focused nonprofit organization
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comes from CVE grants (CREATE, 2015). CVE programs leverage funding for nonprofit and
local governmental agencies to ensure that organizations who receive CVE funding carry out
programming with counter-radicalization messages (CVE Program Assessment, 2015). CVE
grant programs support the development of community-based CVE initiatives as well as
providing funds to create and facilitate CVE programming. Moreover, CVE provides funds to
non-profit organizations that provide additional support and services to targeted communities
such as after school programs, sporting activities, mental health care. For example, the Somaliled nonprofit organization Ka Joog received generous CVE funding for engaging with Somali
"at-risk youth" through STEM mentoring and women’s empowerment programs, while Somali
Action Alliance focuses on educational civil rights and civic engagement initiatives for SomaliAmericans (CVE Program Assessment, 2015). In 2017, Ka Joog and another Minneapolisbased nonprofit organization rejected CVE grant worth half a million dollars to protest Trump’s
Muslim ban (Montemayor, 2017). However, the Somali Muslim community remains suspicious
of Ka Joog and other nonprofit organizations who received CVE grants in the past. Co-opting
social services and programs through CVE's soft surveillance had traumatizing effects on poor,
working class Somali Muslims who lack adequate access to social and support services. The
Muslim community is often suspicious and reluctant to reach out to CVE related service
providers, which includes law enforcement agencies, faith-based organizations, non-profit
organization social service agencies, mental health services, and school systems. (Williams et
al., 2016).
In response to the environment of suspicion, surveillance, and disregard for Black lives,
the Young Muslim Collective (YMC), a grassroots community organization led by young
Somali Muslims in the Twin Cities, held a vigil for the three young Black Muslim men
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murdered in Indiana. The vigil was part of YMC's larger effort to combat Anti-Black racism
and Islamophobia through community organizing and education initiatives. Additionally, the
YMC is leading the local resistance against CVE programs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.
The YMC has organized numerous community forums and rallies against CVE programs,
published literature to educate the public on the adverse impact of CVE programs on Somali
Muslims, and held meetings with public officials and civic leaders to voice the concerns of
Somali community. Unlike most nonprofit organizations serving the Somali community in
Minnesota, the YMC does not receive any public funding and relies on donations and
fundraisers to fund its community organizing (Mirza, 2017). As a decentralized collective, the
YMC believes that its proactive resistance and community organizing against surveillance and
criminalization of Somalis cannot be sustained while receiving CVE funding grants (Mirza,
2017). The YMC organizing and fundraising model enable the collective to organize
effectively against CVE initiatives while refusing to co-opt the organization and the resources it
provides to Somali Muslims in Minnesota. CVE grants entrench surveillance and policing
within the Somali Muslim community, and the YMC's activism and resistance underscored the
contradictions embedded in the work of nonprofit organizations such as Ka Joog, whose
message of serving the Somali community was undermined by their connections to CVE
initiatives.
The rejection of CVE funding by some Minneapolis-based nonprofit organizations
reveals the impact of the YMC in interrogating the practices of CVE-funded nonprofit
organizations and holding such organizations accountable. The YMC's tactics include
disrupting meetings and forums held by CVE-funded organizations and publically questioning
civic leaders (Mirza, 2017). This has been an effective method of demanding responsibility
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from such organizations. Furthermore, the YMC’s community engagement initiatives are often
created to provide an alternative for the Somali Muslim community to CVE-funded initiatives
and programming. For example, Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS), a community mentorship
program targeting Somali youth, received CVE funding in 2015. BBBS' mentorship program,
which was slotted to begin in early 2016, did not attract much attention as Somali youth
preferred to participate in the YMC’s mentorship program. According to Ayaan Dahir, an
organizer with the YMC, "[the YMC] wanted to ask the school to not partner with [BBBS]. At
the same time, we did not want to deny students any enrichment they would have gained"
(Mirza, 2017). The YMC's mentorship programs remains popular and in -high-demand within
the Somali Muslim community.
Additionally, the YMC is working to create a comprehensive report that documents
organizations and individuals who applied for CVE funding, and lawmakers who lobbied and
advocated for CVE initiatives. YMC hopes that the report will enable the public to hold
lawmakers and nonprofit organizations accountable and to efficiently respond to the damaging
consequences of CVE programs (AFSC, 2017). Adhering to its intersectional vision and
politics, the YMC situates its struggle against Islamophobia and the surveillance of Muslims
within its larger anti-racist framework (Mirza, 2017). Interrogating the entanglement of AntiBlack racism and Islamophobia is central to the politics, vision, and practices of the YMC,
which exemplifies how acknowledging the material condition and lived realities of Somalis as
Black Muslim results in efficient and powerful form of resistance. Sustained collective and
communal organizing are essential in the struggle against the suspect-less surveillance and
criminalization of Muslims in the United States. Black Muslims have a long and rich tradition
of resistance and organizing against state-sanctioned surveillance and violence and situating
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their activism within Black working-class resistance (Curtis, 2006). The YMC's model of
community organizing, outreach, and inclusive programming is a useful paradigm of resistance
that is collaborative, communal and productive. The YMC’s versatile organizing and forms of
resistance empower the Somali Muslim community and enables Somalis to practice a level of
control and resistance that was not possible before. The insights provided by the Black Muslim
experience and the foregrounding of CVE resistance within larger Anti-Black and anti-racists
politics provides an expansive and inclusive framework of Muslim resistance. The revival of
mass-mobilization, protest and collective organizing in the wake of Trump's presidency offers
hope and opportunity for collaborative, national and communal responses to existing social,
economic and political inequalities. The YMC and Black Muslims struggle against surveillance
and criminalization of Somalis signifies the beginning of a transformative social movement.
Directions for Future Research
This research is deeply political and personal endeavor that was born out of my own
frustration at the constant erasure and marginalization I felt as a Black Muslim woman. I
wanted to understand my social location, to reconcile the fractures in my intersectional identity
and, more importantly, to find my existence, and that of my people reflected in my work and
writing. This is my way of exclaiming that Black Muslim lives matter! My anxieties around
undertaking such personal and significant project have been compounded by the election of
Donald Trump to office. Theorizing at the intersections of Anti-Black racism, Islamophobia,
and state surveillance has been emotionally and mentally taxing, especially given how I am
intimately impacted by these structures. The intentional focus of the research is designed to
theorize about the systemic relation between Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia and how
such oppressive practices are deployed within and vis-à-vis the American surveillance
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apparatus. Contextualizing forms of suspect-less surveillance of Black Muslims within the
overarching state practices of social control, especially those targeted at Black communities,
counters the historical and contemporary erasure of the Black Muslim experience in the United
States.
Although I endeavored to fill gaps within academic scholarship on surveillance and the
intersections of Anti-Blackness and Islamophobia, the Black Muslim experience, and especially
the Somali immigrant experience, remains an underdeveloped field of study. Future research is
required to fully interrogate links between Anti-Black racism and anti-Muslim sentiment.
Future research must incorporate ethnographic and qualitative methods that examine the
experiences of Black Muslims with forms of institutionalized Islamophobia and Anti-Black
racism. Additionally, exploring how Black Muslims' immigrant status complicates their
experience of Islamophobia will provide much-needed nuances that is lacking from academic
scholarship.
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